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REGULATING EXCESSIVE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
I. INTRODUCTION
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AT PUBLICLY OWNED COMPANIES has long been the tar-
get of corporate governance reformers. In the 1930s, those advocates attacked ex-
cessive executive compensation through lawsuits, claiming that corporate directors
were breaching their fiduciary duties by making excessive bonus payments to exec-
utives. That effort was unsuccessful because the courts found themselves simply
unable to devise a workable formula for determining when executive compensation
becomes excessive. Another effort would be made in this century to use fiduciary
duties to challenge a particularly gross case of over-compensation at the Walt Dis-
ney Company, but it too failed on the same grounds-the courts are institutionally
unable to deal with this issue.
Another executive compensation reform effort was folded into Franklin
Roosevelt's declaration of war on corporate America when he ran for and was
elected President in 1932. A centerpiece of that assault was the enactment of the
Securities Act of 1933' and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 which created the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). One purpose of those laws was to
shame executives into accepting lower compensation through the SEC's full disclo-
sure regulations. As will be seen, not only did that effort fail, it has spurred compe-
tition for even higher levels of executive compensation.
President Roosevelt also sought to confiscate excessive compensation through
high marginal income tax rates and death taxes, but that campaign also proved to
be a failure. High tax rates only discouraged risk taking and encouraged avoidance
and evasion of payment. Today, the "supply side" economists are carrying the day
in their advocacy of lower marginal rates for wealthy executives. Criminal prosecu-
tions and civil tax trials were another part of Roosevelt's war on high profile corpo-
rate moguls. Those prosecutions were used to attack highly paid executives who
were political opponents of the Roosevelt administration. Those cases met only
mixed success and were eventually abandoned, for the most part, until recent years.
Following the stock market crash in 2000, prosecutions were again directed at
the highly and excessively compensated heads of failing companies, such as those at
Enron, Adelphia and WorldCom. Again, those prosecutions met only mixed suc-
cess, but several of those trials resulted in lengthy sentences for the executives. As in
the case of other judicial proceedings aimed at compensation excesses, however,
those prosecutions required extended and expensive investigations, and equally
long and expensive trials. In the end, these trials did nothing to slow the rise in
executive compensation.
Undeterred by their lack of success on limiting executive compensation through
taxes and prosecutions, reformers took another approach in the 1980s. They then
focused on options as a means of aligning the interests of executives and sharehold-
1. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)).
2. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2006)).
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ers through performance based incentive compensation. It was thought such incen-
tives would induce the executive to boost the company's stock price and thereby
benefit shareholders in the process. Congress aided that effort by creating tax in-
centives, but this initiative failed spectacularly, and actually served to push execu-
tive compensation into the stratosphere.
This Article traces corporate governance reform efforts to curb excessive execu-
tive compensation. This Article describes how those efforts failed and how, ironi-
cally, they actually encouraged abuses in executive compensation. The Article then
describes the most recent set of reforms that followed those abuses and explains
why they too will only encourage ever greater levels of compensation. Finally, the
Article addresses the issue of whether executive compensation should be taken out
of the hands of the reformers and left to the marketplace, ever how inefficient it
might be.
II. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND FULL DISCLOSURE
A. The Robber Barons
Corporate governance reformists have long focused their attention on executive
compensation as a measure of abuse by management and loss by shareholders. The
Robber Barons of the nineteenth century seem to have been the ones who first gave
rise to these concerns. The reformers of the Robber Baron era, then called "muck-
rakers," were mostly journalists. They exposed the fantastic wealth of the Robber
Barons as well as some of their industrial abuses.' The "conspicuous consumption"
of some members of that genre included such things as a "palatial chateaux on New
York's Fifth Avenue, their ornamentented 'cottages' in Newport, their extravagant
parties, their oceangoing yachts, their retinues of servants, and their arranged mar-
riages . .. ."'
Parties thrown by these moguls were regularly highlighted in the press. One such
soiree involved a formal dinner served indoors with the diners attired in tuxedos
seated upon their favorite horses and attended by liveried servants. A party thrown
3. See generally THE MUCKRAKERS (Arthur Weinburg & Lila Weinburg eds., 2001) (1961). The muckrak-
ers also focused on exposing the cut-throat competition and sometimes unhealthy industrial practices of that
era. See, e.g., HARVEY O'CONNOR, MELLON'S MILLIONS: THE BIOGRAPHY OF A FORTUNE (1933); UPTON SIN-
CLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906) (exposing undesirable practices in meat packing industry); IDA M. TARBELL &
DAVID CHALMERS, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (1904). Today's excessive compensation
reformists still include the New York Times, and some new players as well, such as officials managing state
employee pension funds, union leaders, liberal politicians, some mutual fund trustees and foreign institutional
investors. Joann S. Lublin & Phred Dvorak, How Five New Players Aid Movement to Limit CEO Pay, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 13, 2007, at Al.
4. DAVID CANNADINE, MELLON: AN AMERICAN LIFE 127 (2006). These ostentatious displays of wealth
gave rise to the term "conspicuous consumption." THORNSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS
75 (1912).
5. 1 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM CHRISTOPHER COLUM-
BUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS 351 (2002).
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at Sherry's restaurant in New York at the beginning of the twentieth century was
reported to have cost $200,000 and was so extravagant that the sponsor was ac-
cused of looting funds from an insurance company that he controlled. The actual
cost of the party was $13,000, but that did not lessen the scandal.6 Indeed, that
party resulted in a massive investigation by the State of New York into the entire
insurance industry, resulting in laws that restructured that industry.7
Some of the compensation received by those earlier magnates was unimaginable
at the time. Andrew Carnegie, for example, was paid $10.52 million in 1898, al-
though much of that river of cash was in interest and dividends. A few years later
Carnegie would become the richest man in the world, but only for a short time.'
John D. Rockefeller of Standard Oil fame pushed Carnegie aside for the richest
man title. Rockefeller was also in the $10 million per year club. Indeed, he was said
to have made $55 million in a period of just nine months.9 Interestingly, those
"Captains of Industry" were not always profligates. Andrew Carnegie, J.P. Morgan,
John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Mellon, although living comfortably well beyond
the means of the rest of the world, were less than ostentatious spenders, often
focusing their wealth on philanthropy. Perhaps to soothe their consciences, or just
because they believed it was the right thing to do, many of the Robber Barons
became the great benefactors of universities (e.g., Vanderbilt, Stanford, Duke, and
the University of Chicago), art galleries (e.g., the National Gallery in Washington,
D.C. and the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York), libraries (e.g., New York
Public Library, the Morgan Library, and the Carnegie libraries) and many other
symbols of progressivism that today dominate the cultural life of America, such as
dance companies, orchestras, concert halls and even the Nobel Prize. The charitable
acts of those Robber Barons are now being mimicked by the modern day tycoons
who are under attack for the vast wealth they have accumulated."
B. Fiduciary Duties
A second reform movement that began in earnest in the 1930s was centered .in
academia, often at universities heavily endowed by the excess executive compensa-
tion that they attacked. The thesis of those reformers had its genesis in the
6. PATRICIA BEARD, AFTER THE BALL 4, 126 (2003).
7. Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and After the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, 25 J. CORP. L. 723, 730- 31 (2000).
8. CANNADINE, supra note 4, at 128; PETER KRASS, CARNEGIE 411 (2002).
9. RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 397 (1998).
10. John D. Rockefeller gave away $530 million during his life time. Id. at 570. Sandy Weill, the now retired
head of Citigroup, has given away an equal amount in recent years, including $30 million to renovate Carnegie
Hall that was built by his Robber Baron predecessor. Two of the other wealthiest executives, Bill Gates and
Warren Buffett, are combining much of their large multi-billion dollar fortunes into one large charitable foun-
dation. Louis Uchitelle, The Richest of the. Rich, Proud of the New Gilded Age, Charity and Skills Justify It All,
Tycoons Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, at Al, A20 .
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landmark work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in the 1930s." Those authors
observed that public companies with dispersed shareholders were experiencing a
separation of ownership and control, with control being vested in managers. Berle
and Means were concerned that the managers would be tempted to manage for
their own interests, rather than those of the owner-shareholders. A principal con-
cern was that those managers would compensate themselves excessively, whatever
their performance as managers."
To counter that temptation, reformists urged the courts to apply fiduciary duties
to corporate executives so that those managers would be forced, at the risk of per-
sonal liability, to place shareholder interests in front of their personal desire for
more wealth. Economists of that era further contended that express limits should
be placed on executive compensation, asserting that no man could be worth $1
million per year. That pronouncement came after the stock market excesses of the
1920s, which had witnessed a steep increase in executive compensation." "By 1928
the executives of some of our largest companies were receiving compensation run-
ning as high as $1,000,000 or $1,500,000 annually..' 4
The fiduciary duty concept, which posits that such duties should seek to prevent
waste of corporate assets, was used to challenge one particularly large compensa-
tion scheme during that era.'" In Rogers v. Hill, the Supreme Court held that an
executive bonus compensation scheme could become excessive when it provided
large, unexpected profits to executives.' 6 The executives at the American Tobacco
Company had received a windfall as the result of an unexpected explosion in ciga-
11. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
The Hoover Institution has asserted that this was one of the most influential books published in the twentieth
century. JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE SCANDALS FROM ENRON TO
REFORM 152 (2006) [hereinafter MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS]. Adolf Berle's "name rhymed with 'surly'
(Time's apt touch)." ROBERT L. BEISNER, DEAN ACHESON: A LIFE IN THE COLD WAR 16 (2006). Berle's biogra-
phy was entitled "Liberal," but some of his views were rather radical. Notable among them was his suggestion
that everyone should study the Soviet system as a "great alternative to our own system of capitalism" and "that
an uncontrolled system, like our own, in the long run is headed for a smashup." JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL:
ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA 74 (1987).
12. The same claims are being made in this century. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (asserting that management
self-interest has led to runaway compensation even with lagging performance); see also Lucian A. Bebchuck &
Jesse M. Fried, Pay without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005) (discussing this
claim). But see JAMES MCCONVILL, THE FALSE PROMISE OF PAY FOR PERFORMANCE: EMBRACING A POSITIVE
MODEL OF THE COMPANY EXECUTIVE (2005) (arguing that management seeks to act in the best interests of
shareholders). For a description of the current academic schools of thought on excessive executive pay, see
William W. Bratton, The Academic Tournament Over Executive Compensation, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1557 (2005)
(reviewing BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra).
13. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 288.
14. George T. Washington, The Corporation Executive's Living Wage, 54 HARV. L. REV. 733, 734 (1941).
15. For a discussion of the waste doctrine in the context of excessive executive compensation, see John W.
Murrey, II, Excessive Compensation in Publicly Held Corporations: Is the Doctrine of Waste Still Applicable?, 108
W. VA. L. REV. 433 (2005).
16. 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933). This case was accompanied by much scandal. Martin T. Manton, the judge
on the Second Circuit who wrote an opinion upholding the compensation scheme, was convicted of bribery.
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rette consumption that began with World War 17 The American Tobacco Com-
pany compensation scheme, which had been approved by shareholders, provided
executives with a bonus of 10 percent of earnings increases over a benchmark
amount. The American Tobacco president received $842,000 in 1930 as a bonus,
plus his salary of $168,000. This payout came just as the Great Depression was
settling on the country, arousing much controversy. The Supreme Court ruled that
compensation could at some point become so excessive as to amount to waste, but
set no formula for that determination. Instead, it remanded the case for the district
court to consider. The claim was then settled with few changes in the scheme. A
subsequent challenge to that compensation scheme led a New York court to simply
throw up its hands on the issue."
Another high profile challenge to executive pay was directed at Bethlehem Steel
in 1931.9 The executive at the center of that attack was Charles M. Schwab, who
had helped Andrew Carnegie with the sale of his steel mills to U.S. Steel as the
twentieth century began. U.S. Steel then became the first $1 billion company and
the largest business enterprise in the world. As a reward for his efforts, Schwab was
made the head of that giant enterprise at the then unbelievable annual salary of $1
million. Schwab was a big spender, notorious for his appearances at casinos in
Monte Carlo.2" Schwab built a house on New York's Riverside Drive at a cost of
nearly $4 million. Schwab's residence included its own swimming pool, gym, and
power plant.2' After quarrelling with his board at U.S. Steel, Schwab took control of
Bethlehem Steel, and turned it into an industry giant. "2 Schwab created a bonus
system at Bethlehem Steel that paid its executives over $6 million between 1911 and
1929. Those payments were challenged by shareholders as being excessive and in
breach of the board's fiduciary duties.23 That effort met only limited success
through a settlement.24
Another high visibility attack on excess executive pay occurred in 1934. This was
a challenge to the compensation paid to the chief executive officer (CEO) at the
National City Bank, Charles Mitchell, who had been paid $1.4 million in 1928 as a
Judge Manton accepted a "loan" of $250,000 from the American Tobacco Company that was never repaid.
David Margolick, Deleted From Book Gifts to Alfred E. Smith, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1985, at Al.
17. "By the end of the 1920s, the per capita consumption by adult American adults reached four [ciga-
rettes] per day." RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES 69 (1996).
18. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 669 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941), affd, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (N.Y. App. Div.
1941).
19. Washington, supra note 14, at 737-41.
20. One particular gambling spree in Monte Carlo gave rise to much bad press because it looked like the
head of U.S. Steel was a reckless gambler and might do the same with shareholder funds. KRAss, supra note 8,
at 435.
21. Dero A. Saunders, Sixty Years Ago in Forbes, FORBES, Feb. 16, 1981, at 143.
22. 2 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM J.P. MORGAN TO THE
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1900-1970) 12-13 (2002) [hereinafter MARKHAM, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS].
23. Washington, supra note 14, at 738.
24. Id. at 737-41.
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bonus.2" Mitchell was somewhat infamous by the time of this challenge, having
been charged with income tax fraud involving a stock buyback scheme with his
wife. That bit of legerdemain allowed him to evade paying taxes on over $1 million
in income in 1929. That case went to the Supreme Court, and Mitchell avoided jail,
but had to pay taxes on the sales. 6 Mitchell was carrying other baggage. Before
being promoted to lead the National City Bank, he had headed its broker-dealer
subsidiary that became infamous for high pressure sales programs promoting
worthless securities. Those operations led to the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act,
which required the separation of commercial and investment banking. 27 Mitchell
was also responsible for legislation strengthening the Federal Reserve Board in
Washington, after he defied its efforts to raise interest rates to cool the stock market
bubble in the 1920s.28 Yet, despite his reputation, the challenge to Mitchell's pay at
the bank was successful only in establishing that certain incentive compensation
had been wrongly computed.29
In the wake of these cases, Professor Washington at the Cornell Law School
noted that, although it was being said that "'no man can be worth $1,000,000 a
year.' Perhaps that is true. Perhaps not. In any event, it is hardly a matter for courts
and lawyers to settle."3" This professor also noted that, by 1941, the courts had
declined to determine what level of compensation was appropriate:
In effect, they put aside the problem of "reasonableness;" and simply ask: "Is
this corporation being honestly and fairly run by its directors, with observance
of the formal requirements of the law?" If the answer is in the affirmative, the
judgment of the directors as to the amount of compensation which should be
paid to the executives will be allowed to control.3
In fact, claims over excessive compensation seem to have been pretty much re-
moved from the courts after Professor Washington's article until a challenge in this
century that involved a severance payment of $130 million to Michael Ovitz by the
Walt Disney Company. Ovitz received that payment even though he was termi-
nated after only fourteen ineffective months on the job. Despite the staggering size
of that payment, the Supreme Court of Delaware could find no breach of fiduciary
duties by the Walt Disney directors in negotiating the employment contract that
provided for such a massive severance payment for so little work. The court then
ruled that the size of the payment was protected by the business judgment rule,
25. Id. at 748-52.
26. MARKHAM, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, supra note 22, at 182.
27. Id. 115-17, 179-80.
28. Id. at 152-53, 167.
29. Washington, supra note 14, at 748-52.
30. Id. at 759.
31. Id. at 758-59.
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which posits that courts will not second guess the business judgment of corporate
officers and directors absent a breach of fiduciary duties.32
These cases demonstrate that the courts simply do not have ability, or desire, to
review executive compensation levels to determine whether they are excessive and
will generally defer to the board of director's discretion on such matters. The busi-
ness judgment rule, therefore, means that corporate reformers must look elsewhere
for tools to curb what they believe is excessive compensation.
C. SEC Full Disclosure
The federal securities laws are premised on the theory that disclosure will not only
allow an informed investment decision, but will also deter abusive practices by
corporate managers.33 In the famous words of Louis Brandeis "sunlight is said to be
the best of disinfectant, electric light the most efficient policeman." " As also noted
by Felix Frankfurter, one of the architects of the Securities Act of 1933, 35 that legis-
lation was intended to have an "in terrorem" effect on corporate managers and that:
The existence of bonuses, of excessive commissions and salaries, of preferential
lists and the like, may all be open secrets among the knowing, but the knowing
are few. There is a shrinking quality to such transactions; to force knowledge of
them into the open is largely to restrain their happening.6
This proved to be an empty promise, but to the adherents of SEC full disclosure it
has taken on mythical tones that endure even today.
One of the federal securities' laws' principal targets of reform was excess execu-
tive compensation. That effort was spurred by corporate executives who increased
their salaries to compensate for reduction in profit based bonuses after the Stock
Market Crash of 1929. Those increases came while thousands of employees were
32. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 52-53 (Del. 2006). This was
not the only case of excessive compensation at Walt Disney. Another executive, Jeffrey Katzenberg, was paid
$280 million by Disney to settle his compensation claims. JAMES B. STEWART, DISNEY WAR 328 (2005). Michael
Eisner, the CEO at Walt Disney, was paid over $750 million while he was making some colossal management
blunders as head of the company. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 32. Contra D.A. Jeremy
Teleman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Executive Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829 (2007)
(arguing that the business judgment rule should not be applied to compensation decisions and using the Ovitz
litigation as an example).
33. This theory proved to be a failure in preventing the market bubble that occurred at the end of the last
century. The bursting of that bubble revealed massive accounting manipulations that were mostly designed to
boost company stock prices and performance based payouts that were tied to the stock price. Executives were
also finding other ways to profit from jumps in their company's stock price. A 2006 study sponsored by the
New York Times found that 41 percent of the companies merging over the prior twelve months experienced
unusual trading activity in their stock before the public announcement of the merger. Gretchen Morgenson,
Whispers of Mergers Set Off Bouts of Suspicious Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, § I, at 1.
34. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1932).
35. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)).
36. Felix Frankfurter, Securities Act-Social Consequences, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 55.
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being laid off and rendered destitute.37 As part of an effort to curb those excesses,
the Securities Act of 1933 was intended to make full disclosure mandatory in public
offerings.
The statute included schedules setting forth disclosures required to be included
in prospectuses." Section 14 of schedule A (for domestic companies) required dis-
closure of the compensation of officers and directors for the prior year and the year
following the offering if such compensation was in excess of $25,000."9 Section 10
of schedule A also required the identification of any options on the company's
stock and the identity of the holders.4" As originally enacted, the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 additionally required companies traded on stock exchanges to
disclose the compensation of officers, directors, and persons other than directors
and officers, exceeding $20,000 per year.4' Bonus and profit sharing arrangements
had to be disclosed,42 as well as options issued on the registrant's stock. 3
In 1938, the SEC adopted executive compensation disclosure requirements for
proxy statements. 44 The SEC, thereafter, periodically adjusted its various compensa-
tion disclosure requirements.45 In 1978, for example, it required disclosure of all
direct and indirect compensation in tabular form, including options. In 1980, the
SEC amended its rules to require disclosure of the amounts of unexercised options.
In 1983, the SEC acted again on executive compensation, adopting a narrative ap-
proach to such disclosures. The amendments required disclosure only of the net
value realized from the exercise of options.
46
In 1992, the SEC adopted significant revisions to its disclosure requirements that
moved from a narrative disclosure approach to formatted tabular disclosures. The
SEC joined the then ongoing executive compensation reform crusade and tried to
discourage excessive compensation through disclosures that would presumably
shame executives from seeking large payouts. The rules adopted by the SEC, among
other things, required disclosure of the compensation of the CEO and the other top
four highest paid managers. The compensation committee was required to describe
the performance factors it used in setting the compensation of the CEO and to
37. Washington, supra note 14, at 734-35.
38. §§ 77a-77aa, 48 Stat. at 74, 81.
39. Id. at 89.
40. Id. at 88.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 781(D)-(E) (1933).
42. Id. § 781(F).
43. Id. § 781(G).
44. Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 8655, Exchange Act
Release No. 53,185, Investment Company Act Release No. 27, 218, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542, 6543 n.40 (proposed Feb.
8, 2006) (to be codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.).
45. These disclosure rules were amended in 1942, 1952, 1978, and 1983. Id. In addition, five interpretative
releases on executive compensation disclosures were issued between 1977 and 1981. Disclosure of Executive
Compensation, Securities Act Release No. 6486, Exchange Act Release No. 20,220, Investment Company Act
Release No. 13,529, 48 Fed. Reg. 44,467, 44,468 n.2 (Sept. 29, 1983) (to be codified in scattered sections of 17
C.F.R.).
46. Disclosure of Executive Compensation, supra note 45, at 44,468 n.2.
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discuss its policies with respect to other executive officer compensation. The com-
pany also had to disclose the hypothetical value of option grants using the Black-
Scholes model or some other recognized valuation method. In addition, the per-
formance of the company's stock had to be compared to that of an index of stocks
such as the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 Composite Price Stock Index.47
The SEC's disclosure regulations did not curb executive compensation packages.
Rather, they only encouraged competition for ever larger packages, 8 and disclosure
actually made the most excessive payments legitimate, i.e., because it was disclosed,
there was no wrongdoing. 9 This competition became institutionalized through
"peer group" reviews that compared the CEO's compensation package with those of
other CEOs. That meant each executive in the peer group was competing against
the other to push packages upward, and the peer group selection could be manipu-
lated to assure the highest possible package. 0 Among those claimed to have abused
this practice, pushing his compensation into the stratosphere, was Richard Grasso,
the head of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) who was given a $187 million
retirement package.51
The disclosures mandated by the SEC gave rise to an industry of compensation
consultants who scoured those reports for information that would boost their cli-
ent's case for increased compensation. Those consultants were also seeking to cre-
ate ever more innovative compensation increases for their clients that were quickly
mimicked by others. 2 Efforts are now underway to challenge the use of such con-
sultants through class action lawsuits that claim conflicts of interest and breach of
fiduciary duties. 3 Then again, that will only add more expense that will be ab-
sorbed by other shareholders or passed onto consumers. Indeed, pay consultants
are already demanding indemnification from their corporate clients for claims aris-
ing from their advice. 4 Once indemnified, they will no doubt redouble their efforts
for the justification of ever higher compensation levels.
47. Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, Exchange Act Release No. 31,227,
Investment Company Act Release No. 19,032, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126, 48,127 (Oct. 21, 1992) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.). The courts have held that a company need not disclose the amount of shares or
their value in submitting a stock option plan to shareholders for approval. Only after the fact, disclosure was
required. Seinfeld v. Becherer, 461 F.3d 365, 373 (3d Cir. 2006); Seinfeld v. Gray, 404 F.3d 645, 649- 50 (2d Cir.
2005).
48. Joann S. Lublin & Scott Thurm, Money Rules: Behind Soaring Executive Pay, Decades of Failed Re-
straints, WALL ST. 1., Oct. 12, 2006, at Al.
49. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 30.
50. Gretchen Morgenson, Gilded Paycheck: Group Think, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006, § 3, at 1.
51. BROOKE A. MASTERS, SPOILING FOR A FIGHT: THE RISE OF ELIOT SPITZER 182 (2006).
52. See Gretchen Morgenson, Corporate America's Pay Pal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006, § 3, at 1 (describing
one such consulting firm and the growth of that activity).
53. Francesco Guerrera, Investors Warn on Use of Pay Consultants, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 2, 2006, at 1.
Among those suing was the Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana. Francesco Guerrera & Brooke Masters,
Companies Asia-Pacific: Advisers Drawn Into Options Scandal, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 29, 2006, at 27.
54. Kaja Whitehouse, Pay Advisers Seek Shelter from Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2006, at B8.
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One study noted that during the period 1992 to 2003, executive pay has grown
much beyond the increase that could be explained by changes in firm size,
performance and industry classification. Had the relationship of compensation
to size, performance and industry classification remained the same in 2003 as
it was in 1993, mean compensation in 2003 would have been only about half
of its actual size."5
Another study shows that CEO compensation quadrupled between 1992, when the
SEC's regulations were adopted, and 2006, while the real wages of average workers
were declining.5 6 As will be seen, the SEC's full disclosure system also corrupted a
large portion of corporate America as executives sought to meet the expectations of
financial analysts and boost stock prices in order to reap large profits from incen-
tive programs.5 7
III. TAX LAWS AND OPTIONS
A. The Tax Laws
Another method used to attack excessive compensation was the federal tax laws,
which after the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, allowed the use of "progres-
sive" income taxes. The first tax under that amendment was levied in 1913 at a rate
of 7 percent on those few Americans with incomes of over $500,000.8 That rate
was later increased to 65 percent for investment income.5 9 In the 1920s, however,
Andrew Mellon, as the Secretary of the Treasury, contended that lower tax rates
would encourage economic growth and reduce tax avoidance by the wealthy, who
were then investing heavily in tax exempt municipal bonds.' After some initial
setbacks, Mellon was able to convince Congress to lower the top rate to 25 percent
in 1926. Exempt entirely from taxation were married filers with incomes of less
than $4,000, which included most of the country. 6' After the passage of that tax,
Mellon asserted that the income tax had "become a class rather than a national
tax," and he was able to substantially reduce the national debt after those changes.62
55. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL'Y
283 (2005). "Only twice before over the last century [i.e., 1915-1916 and the late 1920s] has 5 percent of the
national income gone to families in the upper one one-hundredth of a percent of the income distribution-
currently, the almost 15,000 families with incomes of $9.5 million or more a year...." Uchitelle, supra note 10,
at Al, A20.
56. Eduardo Porter, After Years of Growth, What about Workers' Share?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006, § 3, at
3.
57. See infra notes 131-44 and accompanying text.
58. TAX FOUND., FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES HISTORY (2007), available at http://www.
taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/151.html (last visited July 9, 2007).
59. CANNADINE, supra note 4, at 287.
60. Id. at 287.
61. Id. at 318.
62. Id.
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Mellon's "supply side" economics proved to be decades ahead of his time, and his
tax cuts proved to be but short lived. Tax rates on the wealthy were raised during
the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt until they were virtually confiscatory.
After Roosevelt's election, the top tax rate was raised to 63 percent from Mellon's
25 percent. A tax bill introduced in 1935, called the "soak-the-rich" bill, raised the
top rate to 79 percent.63 That legislation and other attacks on business by the
Roosevelt administration in 1936' sent the country back into another depression,
just as it seemed to be recovering from the horrors of prior years.65
The top tax rate reached 91 percent during World War II, but was lowered to 70
percent in 1963.' That reduction was part of a "reform" effort by President John F.
Kennedy who thought that lower rates would remove incentives for tax avoidance
and evasion, and allow the closing of loopholes that the wealthy used to reduce
their taxes. Ironically, Republicans, including former President Dwight D. Eisen-
hower, were opposed to the Kennedy cuts, claiming that they were irresponsible in
light of large budget deficits.67 Even after the Kennedy reductions, executives had
little incentive to take risks to increase their wealth because they would retain only
30 percent of any increases. As one executive testified before Congress in 1936, "[i]f
an investment proves successful, most of the profit goes to the government. If un-
successful, the individual bears all the loss; the investor hesitates to wager several to
one on a venture attended with such risk."68 Where risks were taken successfully,
the resulting high tax rates were avoided or evaded by many wealthy individuals
through abusive tax shelters, foundations and other means.
69
The "death" tax or "estate" tax as it is respectively called by its opponents and
proponents was another effort to seize the wealth accumulated by executives during
their careers on which they had already been subject to taxing at near confiscatory
rates. The death tax seized another 50 percent of the decedent's estate in excess of
63. Timelines of the Great Depression, http://www.huppi.com/kangaroo/Timeline.htm (last visited Mar.
28, 2007).
64. Roosevelt was then running on a platform that focused the "entrenched greed" on the part of corpo-
rate executives. Lublin & Thurm, supra note 48.
65. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 609.
66. Timelines of the Great Depression, supra note 63.
67. THEODORE C. SORENSEN, KENNEDY 427-33 (1965).
68. JIM POWELL, FDR's FOLLY 83-84 (2003).
69. For example, the oil depletion allowance could be used legally to reduce taxable income in the amount
of $100,000 down to $10,000. HERBERT S. PARMET, GEORGE BUSH: THE LIFE OF A LONE STAR YANKEE 69
(1997). Other shelters were more questionable. 3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1970-2001) 145 (2002) [hereinafter
MARKHAM, AGE OF DERIVATIVES]. Among those starting their careers as tax shelter promoters was Arthur
Levitt, the future SEC chairman and current leader in the corporate governance scolds. SANDY WEILL & JUDAH
S. KRAUSHAAR, THE REAL DEAL: MY LIFE IN BUSINESS AND PHILANTHROPY 49 (2006). Most recently, Congress
has been investigating tax shelters that are called such things as BLIPS and FLIPS and are sold by accounting
firms that sheltered billions of dollars from taxes. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 480.
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specified amounts."0 It too was avoided or evaded by various schemes. The resi-
dences of many wealthy families looked like the scene of a home invasion after the
death of a surviving parent, as the children grabbed everything movable in order to
avoid the tax-man. Trusts and foundations were also set up to shield wealth from
that tax. This had the effect of preserving wealth rather than redistributing it.
Those trusts and foundations also undercut the most successful wealth redistribu-
tion scheme of all-the American success story of from rags to riches and back to
rags again in three generations, as the wealth succeeding generation would often
squander their parent's estate.
Still another tax, the alternate minimum tax (AMT), was passed to assure that
executives paid at least a minimum amount of tax no matter what tax shelters
might be available. That tax was passed after it was reveled that twenty-one mil-
lionaires had paid no taxes in 1967. 7 1 Of course, like many financial "reforms,"
there were unintended consequences. The AMT is now increasing the tax burden
on many middle class households even as the tax burden was being reduced for the
wealthy.72
Unfortunately for the reformers, the high rate of income tax set by the Roosevelt
and succeeding administrations deeply offended Ronald Reagan, the Hollywood
actor who rose to become President of the United States. Reagan touched off a
movement to roll the top marginal tax rates back, and this effort has become a
pillar of the Republican Party." Reagan believed in the supply side economics ad-
vocated by Andrew Mellon in the 1920s. The supply-siders believed that "high mar-
ginal tax rates created a perverse incentive for American workers and businesses to
slow down, work less, and invest in tax shelters, not productive enterprises. Cut the
confiscatory rates, they said, and people will work harder and invest more.' 74 Rea-
gan and like minded theorists also pointed to the "Laffer" curve to support the
argument that lower taxes can even result in more tax revenues through increased
economic growth. 5 They further asserted that, with lower tax rates, there will be
less incentive to avoid or evade taxes.76
70. See Barbara Redman, Rethinking the Progressive Estate and Gift Tax, 15 AKRON TAX J. 35 (2000)
(describing the estate and gift tax).
71. David Wessel, Commentary, Capital: U.S. Scores a Win against Tax-Shelter Abuse, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31,
2006, at A2.
72. Jonathan Weisman, Senate Passes $70 Billion in Tax Cuts over 5 Years, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2006, at A6.
Another effort to tax the rich, the "luxury tax," also boomeranged. Passed in 1990, that legislation imposed a 10
percent tax on the purchase of luxury items like yachts and jewelry. The result was that the rich stopped buying
such items in the United States, causing boat yards to shut down and resulting in losses of other jobs in the
luxury market. The luxury tax was then repealed, having lasted just three years. Kimberly A. Strassel, Reluctant
Class Warriors, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2007, at A8.
73. MARKHAM, AGE OF DERIVATIVES, supra note 69, at 179.
74. JAMES A. BAKER III WITH STEVE FIFFER, "WORK HARD, STUDY . .. AND KEEP OUT OF POLITICS!" 173
(2006).
75. STEVEN F. HAYWARD, THE AGE OF REAGAN (19 6 4 -198o) 525 (2001).
76. Id. at 524-26.
VOL. 2 NO. 2 2007
REGULATING EXCESSIVE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Under Reagan, legislation enacted in 1983 cut personal income taxes rates by 25
percent and capital gains taxes went from 28 percent to 20 percent.77 In 1986, cor-
porate tax rates were cut from 46 percent to 34 percent.78 James A. Baker, III, chief
of staff and Secretary of the Treasury during the Reagan administration, recently
was able to boast that "our tax cuts triggered what has now turned out to be more
than twenty-four years of sustained, noninflationary growth, punctuated only by
the two modest slowdowns . .. .""
George H. W. Bush, who succeeded Reagan, was removed from office by voters
after he failed to keep his pledge not to raise taxes ("read my lips, no new taxes")
and after the country experienced a brief economic slowdown that may have been
mitigated by further tax cuts." Although Reagan's views on taxes had many adher-
ents, large spending deficits led to the successful effort by the administration of
William Clinton to raise taxes. That increase appeared to have little effect on a
booming economy and stock market until it crashed in 2000." Learning from his
father's experience, George W. Bush successfully ran for President on two occasions
by seeking tax cuts. Bush was opposed by Democratic candidates who sought to
engender class warfare by seeking more taxes on wealthy corporate executives. 2
Bush overcame those opponents and has been particularly successful in pushing
back tax rates that have fallen chiefly on wealthy executives. Bush even achieved a
phase out, albeit a temporary one, of the death tax. 3
Despite some rocky times, including a near recession inherited from the Clinton
administration, the September 11 attacks, and corporate scandals, the economy
remained strong under Bush's administration and projected budget deficits from
the War on Terror were being cut sharply. Many point to the tax cuts as having
assured that result.8 4 In support of its tax cuts, the Bush administration has pointed
to the fact that the wealthy pay more than their proportionate share of taxes.8" The
top 1 percent of taxpayers (those making over $313,000 annually) paid 37.4 percent
of federal income taxes in 2000, but collectively they received only about 21 percent
of the nation's adjusted gross income. The top 5 percent of income earners were
77. ROBERT V. REMINI, THE HOUSE: THE HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 465-66 (2006).
78. Id. at 477.
79. BAKER WITH FIFFER, supra note 74, at 189.
80. Id. at 480. George H. W. Bush had also termed Reagan's supply side views as "voodoo economics"
when running against him for the presidency. PARMET, supra note 69, at 294.
81. HAYNES JOHNSON, THE BEST OF TIMES: AMERICA IN THE CLINTON YEARS 468 (2001).
82. Howard Dean, the former governor of Vermont, and at one point the leading Democratic contender
for the presidency in 2004 claimed that the Bush administration was "of the corporations, by the corporations,
and for the corporations." Senator John Kerry, who was the eventual Democratic candidate, sought higher
taxes on the wealthy even though his multi-millionaire wife was using every available tax loophole to keep her
tax rate below 12.5 percent. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 561.
83. Id. at 525, 536-37.
84. Lawrence B. Lindsey, 'Every Reason to be Proud,' WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2006, at A12.
85. A 1998 study found that a family of four with an income of less than $10,000 had an effective tax rate
of a negative 17 percent, while a family with over $200,000 in income was paying an effective rate of 22.9
percent. ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER 42 (2003).
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paying 55 percent of personal federal income taxes while receiving 34 percent of
adjusted gross income.8 6 The trend continued even after the Bush tax cuts. 7 In
2004, the top 1 percent of those filing income tax returns paid 35 percent of all
individual income tax payments. Those earning more than $1 million in adjusted
gross income paid a total of $178 billion in taxes."
Those statistics suggest that wealthy businessmen are being punished enough
under the tax code and that any increases will be based on class warfare, not fair-
ness. There is plenty of ammunition available to wage that class war. For example,
it was claimed that in 2004 the top 0.1 percent of taxpayers earned more than the
bottom 40 percent of taxpayers combined. 9 Such claims are based on some rather
skewed statistics,90 but that will not stop criticism, particularly as the 2008 presi-
dential election warms up. The new Democratic majority leaders are already threat-
ening tax increases.9 John Edwards, the populist Democratic candidate is actually
running on a platform promising increased taxes for those making over $200,000
in order to pay for his plan to socialize health care in America.92 Still, any large
increases will only be avoided or evaded as they have in the past. Otherwise, there
will be little incentive for business success and everyone will suffer, rich and poor,
but especially the poor who will be the first to lose their jobs as entrepreneurs lose
their incentive to take the large risks that must be encountered in the development
of any new business.
B. Golden Parachutes
After failing in the courts and losing the battle in Congress over confiscatory tax
rates, corporate governance reformers looked elsewhere for a means to limit execu-
tive compensation. "Golden parachutes" were one subject of their attacks. Golden
86. Id. at 524.
87. Lindsey, supra note 84.
88. Editorial, The Top 1% Pay 35%, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2006, at A18.
89. Ben Stein, Out of the Clubhouse and into the Classroom, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2006, § 3, at 1.
90. Alan Reynolds, The Top 1% ... of What?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2006, at A20.
91. See John Heilprin, Pelosi Studies Ways to Pay for Middle-Class Tax Cuts, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale,
Fla.), Jan. 8, 2007, at 10A (noting that Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi threatened tax increases on those
making over $500,000).
92. John M. Broder, Familiar Face, but a New Tone to the Message, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2007, at Al.
Edwards was also charging that higher taxes should be imposed on hedge fund managers who he claimed were
paying taxes at marginal rates less than their secretaries. Christopher Cooper, Edwards, Trailing Rivals, Is Promi-
nent on Liberal Platform, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2007, at A5. This immediately set off a cry in the press for such
taxes. Alan S. Blinder, The Under-Taxed Kings of Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2007, at BU 4; Ben Stein,
The Hedge Fund Class and the French Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2007, at BU 6. However, critics of such
taxation were abundant. Raymond Hernandez & Stephen Labaton, In Opposing Tax Plan, Schumer Shows Sup-
port for Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2007, at Al; Phil Kerpen, The Smart Way to Soak the Rich, WALL ST. J.,
July 30, 2007, at A12; Brody Williams & Sarah Luek, Democrats Lose Zeal for Raising Hedge-Fund Tax, WALL ST.
J., July 31, 2007, at Al.
One prominent economist has asserted that the burden of more taxes on corporations ultimately falls on
workers who will be subjected to lower wages. R. Glenn Hubbard, The Corporate Tax Myth, WALL ST. J., July
26, 2007, at A13.
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parachutes were large payouts to corporate executives when their company was
taken over. The theory in support of these payments was that the executive would
be too worried about his future from the threat of a potentially hostile takeover to
concentrate on the business. Presumably, the golden parachute would remove that
concern. In actual practice, these payments acted as a deterrent to hostile takeovers
because, if pulled, the executives would leave the company with their golden
parachutes, robbing it of needed management and draining the corporate treasury
in the process.
The golden parachute was given a bad name in 1983 when William Agee was
awarded a $3.9 million payout after losing a fight over control of his company,
Bendix.93 Bowing to the cries of outrage over that payment, Congress amended the
Internal Revenue Code in 1984 to prohibit the deduction of golden parachutes
where the payments totaled more than three times the executive's average annual
compensation. A 20 percent excise tax was also imposed on the executives receiving
such payments.94 Ironically, this tax actually legitimized the use of golden
parachutes, which were rare before that tax but spread to more than one-half of
large companies surveyed in 1991. To ease the pain of the excise tax, executives
receiving such compensation were given additional amounts (called a "gross up")
to cover its payment.95 Recently, John Kanas received a golden payout of $185 mil-
lion after his company, North Fork Bancorp, was taken over.96 James Kilts received
$180 million after the merger of Gillette and Proctor Gamble, a payout that raised
howls of outrage.97 Wallace Barr, CEO at Caesars Entertainment was paid $20 mil-
lion after his company was taken over by Harrah's, which seemed paltry as com-
pared to other such payments, but was criticized anyway in the press.9
There were also more ways to milk the cow. Executives were allowed to make
huge profits from their stockholdings in negotiated mergers, which they proceeded
to do after adopting other poison pills to ward off unwonted suitors. Steve Ross at
Warner Brothers pocketed almost $200 million in its merger with Time in 1989."9
Ross was also the first executive to be paid over $10 million in compensation for a
single year's work. That occurred in 1981 when he was paid $22 million.' Another
form of compensation was a large "sign on" bonus.l"' Retirement packages for retir-
93. Lublin & Thurm, supra note 48. Agee's golden parachute seems small. It paid $3.9 million over five
years, while the merger was for $1.9 billion. Henry F. Johnson, Those "Golden Parachute" Agreements: The
Taxman Cuts the Ripcord, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 49 n.25 (1985).
94. James R. Repetti, The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder Interests, 19 CARDOZO
L. REV. 697, 703-05 (1997).
95. Lublin & Thurm, supra note 48.
96. Id.
97. Brett Arends, Whiny Kilts Puts Boston on Notice, Bos. HERALD, Sept. 9, 2005, at 005.
98. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 563.
99. THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 1023
(2d ed. 2006).
100. Lublin & Thurm, supra note 48.
101. Id.
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ing executives were also sometimes huge, as witnessed by the $187 million paid to
Richard Grasso at the NYSE. 02
Even executives given the boot by their company were being richly rewarded for
their lack of success. Carly Fiorina received a $42 million severance package after it
appeared, prematurely, that the merger she had engineered between Hewlett-Pack-
ard and the Compaq Computer was faltering. 3 Cries of outrage arose over the
$200 million retirement package that was given to Henry McKinnell, CEO at Pfi-
zer. 4 That company's stock had fallen by 37 percent during his watch.' Jay Sidhu
was ejected from his role as chairman and CEO Sovereign Bancorp, for poor stock
performance, but was given a $40 million retirement package to ease the pain.'0 6
C. Options
The 1980s witnessed another reform effort that sought to align shareholder inter-
ests with those of management through options grants. 07 Led by Michael Jensen at
the Harvard Business School and Kevin Murphy at University of Rochester, these
theorists believed that options would provide management with an incentive to
work harder in order to increase the price of the stock, thereby benefiting share-
holders. This theory was premised on the belief that managers being paid only a
large salary would have no incentive to work hard and would spend their days on
the golf course.' Despite the possibility that they might be induced to cut their
time on the links, this theory met widespread acceptance even among corporate
executives.
Congress sought to aid the corporate governance options movement through the
Omnibus Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993.09 That legislation prohibited corpo-
rations from deducting more than $1 million for the salary of a CEO or for the
102. See infra note 290 and accompanying text.
103. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 99, at 374. For a description of the hard fought Hewlett-Packard/
Compaq merger, see GEORGE ANDERS, PERFECT ENOUGH: CARLY FiORINA AND THE REINVENTION OF HEWLETT
PACKARD (2003). Despite the size of that package, Fiorina remained bitter over her removal. See generally
CARLY FIORINA, TOUGH CHOICES (2006).
104. Gretchen Morgenson, A Lump of Coal Might Suffice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006, § 3, at 1.
105. Lublin & Thurm, supra note 48.
106. David Enrich & Jamie Levy Pessin, Severance at Sovereign Irks Governance Advocates, WALL ST. J., Oct.
14, 2006, at B3. Unsuccessful corporate executives were not the only ones receiving generous payouts despite
their lack of success. Losing football coaches at various universities were being generously compensated upon
their removal. Steve Weiberg & Jodi Upton, Canning Coach Can Cost College Millions, USA TODAY, Nov. 28,
2006, at IA. Nick Saban defected from the Miami Dolphins for an eight-year $32 million contract at the
University of Alabama. Leonard Shapiro, Saban Deserves the Media Criticism Thrown His Way, WASH-
INGTONPOST.COM, Jan. 9, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/09/
AR2007010900692.html. Other college football coaches were also doing pretty well. Steve Spurrier at the Uni-
versity of South Carolina was given a bump up to $1.75 million for the 2007 season. Press Box. In Brief, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 3, 2006, at C16.
107. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 30-31.
108. Id. at 31.
109. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (codified at I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006)).
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salary of four of the other highest compensated employees without shareholder
approval."' Performance based compensation was excluded from the prohibition
on deductions of over $1 million in salary."' This tax was intended to push execu-
tives toward options as compensation, thereby aligning their interests with those of
shareholders. Nevertheless, as the present SEC chairman recently and ruefully
noted, "[t]his tax law change deserves pride of place in the Museum of Unintended
Consequences.""' 2 This was because, although it had the predictable effect of steer-
ing executives into options because they were performance based and exempt from
the $1 million salary limitation on deductibility, it had the unexpected effect, as
described below, of inducing massive accounting manipulations designed to push
stock prices upward and increase the profits realized from option exercises.
"Incentive stock options" could also be used to obtain tax advantaged capital
gains instead of the higher marginal income tax rates when held for specified peri-
ods." 3 Options, at least until recent years, had another advantage for executives.
Unlike a salary, these awards were not treated as an expense on the company's
books. This meant that option grants had no effect on earnings, no matter how
much the executive received from exercising the options. This was significant be-
cause earnings drive stock prices. If compensated in cash, those earnings would be
hurt by the associated expense.
In view of these incentives, options became popular for executive compensation
schemes. The SEC noted in 1992 that options were one of the "most rapidly grow-
ing areas of executive compensation. Recent studies indicate that more than 90%
[sic] of the leading 200 American industrial and service corporations, respectively,
compensate their executives through awards of stock options."''. By the year 2000,
about 80 percent of executive compensation was being paid in options."'
Compensation schemes at public companies were restructured to cap salaries at
$1 million after the enactment of the Omnibus Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993.
Actually, the $1 million cap on deductible salary became a "minimum wage" for
CEOs,'" 6 and the employment of options as the primary basis for compensation did
not curb the amount of compensation being paid to executives. Indeed, overall
executive compensation increased by 450 percent in the 1990s." At the CEO level,
110. A deduction in excess of $1 million is not allowed even with shareholder approval if the bonus would
have been paid regardless of the outcome of that vote. Seinfeld v. Barrett, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,840 (D.
Del. 2006).
111. Ryan Miske, Note, Can't Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to Control Executive
Compensation through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1684-87 (2004).
112. Eric Dash, Congress Is Urged to Hold Off Acting on Options and Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at C3.
113. 26 U.S.C.A. § 422 (2006).
114. Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6,940, Exchange Act Release No.
30,851, 57 Fed. Reg. 29,582, 29,588 n.32 (proposed July 2, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240).
115. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 561.
116. Lublin & Thurm, supra note 48.
117. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 32.
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compensation witnessed an even more startling increase of 2,500 percent during
that period."'
CEOs were increasingly being given "mega-grants" of options and when those
ran out they were replaced by "reload" options, and when stock prices dropped
their exercise price was "reset" to a lower level." 9 To name a few benefiting from
mega-grants, Larry Ellison, the head of Oracle, made $706 million on his options
in a single year. Michael Dell of Dell Computer was paid $233 million for a single
year of labor. Sanford Weill was paid a total of almost $1 billion while in charge of
Citigroup.'2 ° Michael Eisner at Walt Disney was paid $575 million in 1998 and
received over $900 million in total compensation from that company. William Mc-
Guire at the UnitedHealth Group was paid a whopping $2.2 billion. Another execu-
tive at UnitedHealth received $853 million.' 2' Richard D. Fairbanks at Capital One
Financial was paid $250 million in 2005.122
In order to limit this money grab, reformers sought to require public companies
to expense option grants. This would have reduced earnings and adversely affected
stock prices, making it harder for executives to profit from large option grants. 21
This idea caught the attention of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
in the 1990s, which floated a proposal that would have required options to be
expensed. Opponents asserted that it would be difficult to value options for the
purpose of expensing. The options expensing idea also met stiff resistance from the
so-called dot.com companies of that era that were using option awards to attract
and retain talented employees. This controversy led to
a public rally to demonstrate the grassroots support for stock options. Kathleen
Brown, the California treasurer and daughter of a storied Democratic gover-
nor, shouted to a cheering crowd, 'Give stock a chance!' (It was, presumably,
118. Id. at 30. Another study showed that the gap between CEO compensation and that of other officers at
the same company has only doubled since the 1960s. Lublin & Thurm, supra note 48. See generally Tod Perry &
Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 123 (2000) (describing the growth of executive compensation in the 1990s).
119. Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based Compensation Positively Affect Manage-
rial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 268-69 (1999).
120. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 32.
121. Mark D. Maremont & Charles Forelle, Open Spigot: Bosses' Pay: How Stock Options Became a Part of the
Problem, WALL ST. 1., Dec. 27, 2006, at AI.
122. Lublin & Thurm, supra note 48. In May 2007, Fairbanks began exercising expiring 10-year options
(that had been granted in 1997) at a rate of $3.4 million per week. Fairbanks was expected to exercise a total of
$60 million for 2007 before starting the exercise of a new round of options granted to him in 1998. Patrick
Mcgeehan, What's in His Wallet? Millions in Options, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, at BU2.
123. The effect of expensing would have been dramatic for many companies. Cisco Systems' profit of $4.6
billion in one year would have been a $2.7 billion loss if options had been expensed. Yahoo's profit of $71
million in one year would have been a loss of $1.3 billion if stock options had been expensed. MARKHAM,
CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 31.
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the first mass rally against an accounting standard since the birth of double-
entry bookkeeping).'24
The United States Senate passed a resolution by an overwhelming majority in May
of 1994, condemning the proposal to expense options in May of 1994.2 This reso-
lution led the FASB to retreat from that proposal.
D. Option Scandals
The reason for the overhaul of the SEC's executive compensation disclosure rules in
1992 was its view that
contemporary focus is increasingly on long-term compensation to provide
management with incentives to create shareholder value. This trend toward
increased use of long-term stock compensation reflects the commonly held view
that "real ownership builds commitment and risk on the part of executives and
positively influences long-term decision-making." Recently, these changes have
accelerated, with long-term incentive compensation overtaking the more tradi-
tional fixed salary and bonus to become the largest single component of the
total mix of the typical executive pay package. The growing use and multiplic-
ity of these plans have made executive pay packages extremely complex, and
have led to reporting of compensation that many shareholders find
incomprehensible. 
26
They had it completely backward. In fact, executives were becoming increasingly
focused on short-term management of quarterly earnings reports in order to meet
analysts' expectations. Stock prices thus had to rise before executives could profit
from their option grants. Those stock price increases were largely dependent on the
views of the financial analysts that followed the company. Those analysts focused
on the company's quarterly financial reports.12' A failure to meet even one quarter's
"consensus" earnings estimates by analysts caused a sharp decline in a company's
stock, which undercut the profit on executive stock options.
This constant demand for quarterly increases in earnings had the undesirable
effect of focusing management's attention on short-term goals rather than long
range initiatives that might be a drag on earnings for some considerable period of
124. ROBERT J. SCHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER 15 (2003).
125. Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign Man-
agement and Shareholders' Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
971, 1020-21 (2004).
126. Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6,940, Exchange Act Release No.
30,851, 57 Fed. Reg. 29,582, 29,588 n.32 (proposed July 2, 1992) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240).
127. The quarterly reports were introduced in 1970 by the SEC. Previously, only annual and semi-annual
reports were required. Adoption of Form 10-Q, Rescission of Form 9-K and Amendment of Rules 13a-13 and
15d-13, Exchange Act Release No. 9,004 (Oct. 28, 1970).
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time before becoming profitable. This problem, although seemingly obvious, was
not widely recognized until July 2006, when the Business Roundtable Institute for
Corporate Ethics (BRI) called for the end of quarterly guidance given by executives
to analysts. The BRI stated that quarterly earnings goals had become an obsession
and was diverting attention from long range goals and planning at public compa-
nies.28 This fact should have been recognized even earlier.'29 For example, Enron
advised its shareholders in 2000, the year before its sensational collapse, that the
company was "laser-focused on earnings per share."'"3 There was good reason for
that focus. In the year 2000, over 200 executives at Enron were paid more than $1




Large businesses cannot be run on the premise of continually growing quarterly
earnings. Yet, financial analysts demand constant quarterly growth. "Momentum"
investors will shed a company's stock on the first occasion that analysts' quarterly
consensus estimates are not met. This focuses management on short-term account-
ing ploys and operations at the loss of long-term strategic goals. Options did not
align shareholder values with those of management. Rather, options produced
unimaginable profits for management in the short-term and massive losses to in-
vestors in the long run.
The use of options as the principal basis for executive compensation had other
drawbacks. If the stock price did not go up, executives would have reduced com-
pensation. That was not a major problem during the market run up in the latter
part of the 1990s. Even when there was occasional pause in performance, executives
were often given the opportunity to reset their option exercise prices at a lower
value.'32 When that failed, company accounts were manipulated in order to meet
analysts' expectations. Those manipulations involved such things as "cookie jar
reserves" and "channel-stuffing" as a means to "smooth" earnings.'33 The restate-
128. Francesco Guerrera, Call to End Quarterly Guidance 'Obsession,' FIN. TIMES (London), July 24, 2006,
§ 1, at 1. An unexpected coalition of pension funds and large companies has called for the end of quaterly
earnings guidance by corporate managers. That coalition believes that management should be focused on
longer term goals. Francesco Guerrera, Call to Cut Quarterly Guidance, FIN. TIMES (London), June 27, 2007, at
1; Francesco Guerrera, Demand to Scrap Quarterly Guidance, FIN. TIMES (London), June 18, 2007, at 1.
129. The head of Time Warner, Richard Parsons, had noted after the fall of Enron that:
This is a tension that as managers we have to deal with. We're not a quarter horse. I read somewhere
that the quarter horse is the fastest animal in the world in a quarter of a mile. Because of lots of
dynamics, increasingly the marketplace is demanding quarter by quarter performance that has the
potential to undermine the long term.
KEN AULETTA, MEDIA MAN: TED TURNER'S IMPROBABLE EMPIRE 131 (2004).
130. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fault, Dear Investors, Lies in Ourselves, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2002, at B1.
131. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 68.
132. Stabile, supra note 119, at 235, 268.
133. Matthew A. Melone, United States Accounting Standards-Rules or Principles?: The Devil Is Not in the
Details, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1161, 1180-92 (2004).
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ment of company accounts became a daily occurrence as these schemes fell apart in
the market downturn at the end of the century. " 4
Option grants to executives were at the center of the financial scandals that
rocked the financial world after the market downturn in 2000.' Enron's death
spiral was completed after it announced that it was restating its earnings for 1997 to
2001 in the amount of $586 million. 36 Waste Management Inc., announced a more
spectacular reduction of $1.32 billion.' 3' At WorldCom, the CEO and chief finan-
cial officer (CFO) inflated revenues by $1 billion in the third quarter of 2000 and
$800 million in the fourth quarter. Hundreds of millions of dollars were added in
future quarters through "close the gap" exercises before that company finally
collapsed.
13
Other companies involved in massive manipulations of their accounts included
Nortel Network, Lucent Technologies, Qwest Communications International,
Global Crossing, AOL Time Warner, HealthSouth, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Hol-
linger International, Vivendi Universal SA, Royal Ahold NV, and Parmalat
Finanziaria SpA.'39 Charles Wang, CEO at Computer Associates International, was
paid $700 million in compensation tied to that company's stock price, a record at
the time. It was later revealed that the company had engaged in a massive manipu-
lation of its accounts, adding over $2.5 billion in revenues that did not exist. 4
Enron and other scandals resulted in a new wave of reform in executive pay after
it was revealed that Kenneth Lay, the head of Enron, had received $217 million in
compensation between 1998 and 20012 4" His protegee, Jeffrey Skillling, received
$104 million during that same period. 42 Much of that compensation was in the
form of options. Bernard Ebbers, the head of WorldCom, received the largest grant




134. Arthur Acevedo, How Sarbanes-Oxley Should Be Used to Expose the Secrets of Discretion, Judgment, and
Materiality of the Auditor's Report, 4 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 1, 5 (2005). One study found 723 restatements
between 1997 and 2000. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 213.
135. Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws, 28
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 725, 727-28 (2003).
136. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 83.
137. Id. at 213.
138. United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2006).
139. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 311- 76; see also Andre Douglas Pond Cummings,
"Ain't No Glory in Pain": How the 1994 Republican Revolution and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
Contributed to the Collapse of the United States Capital Markets, 83 NEB. L. Rev. 979, 998-1001 (2005) (describ-
ing some of these scandals and blaming them on Republicans).
140. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 222-23. Another executive at Computer Associ-
ates, Sanjay Kumar, received a $300 million payout. Kumar pleaded guilty to fraud and obstruction of justice
charges for his role in the accounting manipulation. William Bulkeley, Sanjay Kumar Awaits His Sentence, WALL
ST. I., Oct. 28, 2006, at A2. Kumar was sentenced to twelve years in prison. Michael J. de la Merced, Ex-Leader
of Computer Associates Gets 12-Year Sentence and Fine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2006, at C3.
141. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 119.
142. Id. at 116.
143. Id. at 334.
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The FASB jumped in by revisiting the options expensing proposal following the
Enron era scandals, adopting such a requirement after opposition was weakened by
the corporate scandals. That too did little to stem the growth of executive compen-
sation. Although a number of firms stopped granting options,' a study at the
University of Michigan concluded that this requirement did not reduce the overall
number of firms granting options to executives, and grants were up some 24
percent.
E. Sarbanes-Oxley
The Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Reform Act of 2002 was signed into law on July 30,
2002. ' That legislation created a new government oversight board for the account-
ing industry and sought to strengthen internal management controls.'46 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibited loans by public companies to management.'47 This
provision was added after the disclosure of a "co-borrowing" arrangement between
Adelphia Communications and its controlling stockholders, the Rigas family of
Coudersport, Pennsylvania. The Rigas family took down some $3 billion under that
arrangement to fund their extravagant lifestyle.'48 Another big time borrower from
his corporation was Bernie Ebbers at WorldCom, who received over $400 million
in loans from the company before its bankruptcy.'49
Another provision in Sarbanes-Oxley required executives to forfeit their bonuses
if their company has to subsequently restate its financial statements. 50 It was largely
ignored. 5' Unless convicted criminally, executives who were purported to have en-
gaged in wrongdoing usually were able to keep their bonuses.' The SEC was au-
thorized to freeze "extraordinary" compensation payments at companies involved
144. Among those dropping options as compensation was Microsoft, Inc. Tom Abate, Silicon Valley Loses
Fight on Stock Options; Companies Must Deduct Perk's Value When Figuring Profit, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 17, 2004,
at Al.
145. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1, 116 Stat. 745, 810 (2002) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 7201).
146. See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas-The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 113- 17 (2005). This new regulator was
named the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor
Independence, 53 DUKE L.J. 439, 473 (2003).
147. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 § 109(h), 15 U.S.C. §78m(k) (2006).
148. Roger Lowenstein, The Company They Kept, N.Y. TIMES MAO., Feb. 1, 2004, at 28.
149. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 336.
150. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243.
151. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 467, 469. An Alabama court ruled that the
HealthSouth Corp. could recover $46 million from its former CEO, Richard Scrushy, that had been paid to him
during a period when the company was massively manipulating its accounts. The court made that ruling
despite Scrushy's acquittal on federal charges accusing him of being involved in those manipulations, but
ultimately concluding that he was unjustly enriched whatever his involvement. Scrushy v. Tucker, 955 So. 2d
988, 993-96, 1000-12 (Ala. 2006).
152. Phred Dvorak & Serena Ng, Check, Please: Reclaiming Pay From Executives Is Tough to Do, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 20, 2006, at Al.
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in accounting manipulations.'53 This too seems to have been inspired by Bernie
Ebbers, who received an extraordinary compensation package when he was termi-
nated from WorldCom. s4 The SEC sued Jean-Marie Messier, the former chairman
of Vivendi Universal, under this provision and forced him to give up a $25 million
termination package.' 5 In another case, SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc.,'56 a
Ninth Circuit panel held that a payment of $37.6 million in cash and 6.7 million
shares of stock to two executives at Gemstar-TV Guide was not extraordinary,
which meant that those payments could not be frozen pending an SEC action
charging the executives with inflating accounts. That decision was reversed in an en
banc decision of the circuit court.
57
The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation caused public companies to incur massive costs
but seems to have little effect on the integrity of the accounting at public compa-
nies. A new record was set in 2003 for the number of restatements of accounts in
SEC filings, and accounting scandals continued to emerge.' One study found
2,319 restatements between 2003 and 2005."s9 Restatements were down in the first
half of 2006, but still numbered 424.160 That slowdown was not long-lived. 16' A new
annual record for restatements was set in 2006-a total of 1,876 restatements were
filed with the SEC by public companies in 2006.162
The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation also proved to be tremendously expensive and
forced many foreign companies out of U.S. markets. 163 Its onerous burdens is
threatening the premium that once existed for the listing of foreign firms on U.S.
markets. 6 4 Interestingly, foreign firms were tapping the U.S. capital markets
153. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 § 3(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(c)(3)(A).
154. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 337.
155. Id. at 456. For a description of Messier's excesses, see Jo JOHNSON & MARTINE ORANGE, THE MAN
WHO TRIED TO BUY THE WORLD: JEAN-MARIE MESSIER AND VIVENDI UNIVERSAL xii-xiii, 47, 133-35 (2003).
156. 367 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 401 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 933
(2005).
157. SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 933.
158. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 472-79.
159. Steven Marcy, GAO Identifies Cost, Expense Issues as Prevailing Causes of Restatements, 38 SEC. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) 1382 (2006).
160. Floyd Norris, Forcing Reality in Accounting of Tiny Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2006, at C1.
161. David Reilly, Restatement Blame: Basic Mistakes-Fingers Oft Point Elsewhere, but SEC Finds Many
Lapses to Be 'Flat-Out Errors,' WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2006, at C4.
162. David Reilly, Restatements Still Bedevil Firms, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2007, at C7. Those restatements
involved about 10 percent of U.S. public companies. Robert C. Pozen, The SEC's Fuzzy Math, WALL ST. J., Mar.
23, 2007, at All.
163. Francesco Guerrera, Laws 'Driving Companies to Foreign Listings' Sarbanes-Oxley, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 20, 2006, at 28; Alan Murray, Panel's Mission: Easing Capital-Market Rules, WALL ST. J., Sept.
12, 2006, at A2. Because of their expense, the SEC has delayed the effective date of some of the more onerous
Sarbanes-Oxley requirements for smaller firms. David Reilly, SEC Moves to Postpone Deadline on Safeguards,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2006, at C3.
164. Greg Ip, Is a U.S. Listing Worth the Effort?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006, at Cl. One study showed no
decrease in foreign offerings in the United States. Yvonne Ball, IPO Outlook: Do Tough Rules Deter Foreign IPO
Listings in U.S.?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2007, at C3. One study showed that the premium for listing on a U.S.
exchange had declined, but another study disagreed with that conclusion, claiming that a U.S. listing still
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through increased numbers of private equity offerings that did not require registra-
tion with the SEC.' Only one of the top 20 global initial public offerings in 2005
was listed in the United States, down from 60 percent of such offerings five years
earlier. 16 The United States raised only 28 percent of the global equity that was
raised in leading markets in 2006, down from 41 percent in 1995.167 As one
Sarbanes-Oxley critic has noted:
Between 1996 and 2001, the New York Stock Exchange averaged 50 new non-
U.S. listings annually; in 2005, it was 19. In the same year, the London Stock
Exchange, including its small company affiliate, the Alternative Investment
Market, gained 139 new listings while NASDAQ attracted 19. Since the end of
2004, 30 foreign companies have left the NYSE and NASDAQ.
*.. Financial capital-the kind that finances mergers, acquisitions and new
business formation-is also increasingly finding a more comfortable home
abroad. Large offerings by Chinese, Korean and Russian companies-involving
billions of dollars-have occurred in Hong Kong and London; meanwhile, large
new foreign offerings this year by Russian aluminum producers and Kazakh-
stan oil and copper companies are planning to list in London.6 '
The NYSE experienced total delistings valued at $38.8 billion in 2006 and NASDAQ
had withdrawals valued at $11 billion. 169 More directly, SEC regulations impose a
compliance cost of an estimated $25 billion each year. Underwriting costs abroad
are less than half of those in the United States.' The Wall Street Journal has also
noted that venture capital funds traditionally "used the U.S. IPO market as their
exit strategy .... Today, however, nearly 90% of those venture-capital-backed star-
tups are sold to strategic buyers in private transactions." '7
There has been some recognition recently that this regulation has gone awry.
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson has warned that the country was "creating a
thicket of regulation that impedes competitiveness."' 72 Even politicians normally in
favor of every form of regulation were recognizing that things had gone too far.
New York Senator Chuck Schumer co-authored an Op-ed piece in the Wall Street
carries a 17 percent premium over foreign listings. Greg Ip, Maybe U.S. Markets Are Still Supreme, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 27, 2007, at C1.
165. LUIGI ZINGALES ET AL., INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION X
(2006).
166. Hot Topic: Is Wall Street Losing Its Competitive Edge?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2006, at A6.
167. Id.
168. Peter J. Wallison, Capital Punishment, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2006, at A7.
169. Norma Cohen & Peter Smith, Delisting Wave Hits London, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 2, 2007, at 1.
170. Id.
171. Hot Topic: Capital Flight, WALL ST. I., Dec. 2, 2006, at A8; see also Kit R. Roane, The New Face of
Capitalism, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 4, 2006, at 48 (describing the private equity buying binge).
172. Deborah Solomon, Treasury's Paulson Warns of the Costs of Rules Overlap, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2006,
at A2.
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Journal with New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, calling for a study to determine
if New York was losing its position as the world's leading financial center because of
over-regulation and abusive shareholder litigation."' The resulting study called for
a repeal of some of the worst Sarbanes-Oxley provisions and limits on class action
lawsuits.'74 Somewhat cynically, New York Governor Eliot Spitzer, the person most
responsible for the excessive regulation of financial service firms while serving as
New York Attorney General, supported this proposal.' The New York Times, which
normally favors any and all regulation, also signaled that a rollback of the post-
Enron regulations might be in order.'76 There was some reason for this sudden
concern with over-regulation. The securities industry accounts for 20.7 percent of
total wages in New York City and 18.7 percent of total tax receipts in New York
State. 17
7
The SEC has also indicated that it will be backing off some of the more onerous
provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley, 178 at least for small companies.7 7 The SEC is also
seeking to curb class action lawsuits and to limit the liability of accounting firms
for failed audits.8 The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has
sought to ease the most expensive and controversial provision in Sarbanes-Oxley
concerning the adequacy of internal accounting controls. The PCAOB reduced its
rule for accountants making that assessment from 180 to 65 pages.' This reform
was further spurred by a report of a blue ribbon Committee on Capital Markets
that recommended that excessive regulation was hurting the securities markets and
making foreign markets more competitive.8 2 New York Governor Eliot Spitzer
called those proposals "absurd" because they would limit state prosecutions such as
173. Charles E. Schumer & Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York, Learn from London, WALL ST. J., Nov.
1, 2006, at AI8.
174. Aaron Lucchetti, Identity Crisis for New York?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2007, at C3.
175. Aaron Lucchetti, Why Spitzer Is Backing Study that Endorses Less Regulation, WALL ST. I., Jan. 23, 2007,
at C3.
176. Floyd Norris, Winds Blow for Rollback of Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2006, at Cl.
177. ZINGALES ET AL., supra note 165, at ix. The New York Times flirtation with the anti-regulation crowds
did not last long. See Floyd Norris, S.E.C. to Firms: Keep Money, Forget Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006, at C1
(criticizing the SEC for allowing foreign firms seeking relief from Sarbanes-Oxley to withdraw their U.S. regis-
tration). Claims have also been made in the press that foreign markets are becoming more competitive, but
that begs the question of why that is the case, i.e., is it because less regulated foreign markets can now compete
with the crippled U.S. markets? Greg Ip. et al., In Call to Deregulate Business, a Global Twist, WALL ST. J., Jan.
25, 2007, at Al.
178. Kara Scannell & Deborah Solomon, Business Wins Its Battle to Ease a Costly Sarbanes-Oxley Rule, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 10, 2006, at Al; Kara Scannell, SEC to Investors: More Internet, Less Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Dec.
14, 2006, at Cl.
179. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. to Ease Auditing Standards for Small Publicly Held Companies, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2006, at Cl; see also Kara Scannell, SEC to Propose New Guidance on Internet Controls, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 13, 2006, at C4 (noting that the SEC does not require certification of internal controls in non-risky areas).
180. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Seeks to Curtail Investor Suits, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 2007, at Cl.
181. Floyd Norris, Board Proposes Lighter Auditing of Internal Controls, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 20, 2006, at C2.
182. Greg 1p et al., Panel Urges Relaxing Rules for Oversight, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2006, at Cl.
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those that brought him fame and made him governor." 3 In that regard, one justifi-
cation for the oversized payments to executives is the fact that any misstep by them
will result in a mass of lawsuits, investigations and criminal prosecutions.
Those attacks have been further fueled by Sarbanes-Oxley. Settlements in class
action lawsuits brought in the United States claimed $9.6 billion in corporate funds
in 2005 (including a whopping $6.1 billion from the WorldCom litigation), up
from $150 million in 1995.184 There were no such settlements in courts abroad.' It
also seems that each day results in another scandal at a public company.' 6 Those
risks must be compensated for in order for anyone to risk their freedom and repu-
tation from the assaults of prosecutors seeking higher office and class action law-
yers seeking huge attorneys' fees.
CEO turnover is occurring at a frightening rate. Over 1,100 CEOs gave up their
positions in 2006.17 That turnover is certainly not accidental; those managers are
taking their money and running before they become the target of some crusading
prosecutor or reporter bent on their destruction. The loss of those experienced
managers requires their replacement with someone less experienced. The phenom-
enon of the "interim CEO" is now becoming a permanent part of the public com-
pany community. Concern is raised whether these interim CEOs are capable of
leading a giant corporation with which they have had no experience.'
183. Deborah Solomon & Kara Scannell, Financial-Rule Overhaul Hits a Nerve, WALL ST. j., Dec. 1, 2006, at
C3. For a laudatory description of Spitzer's zealous Wall Street prosecutions that included everyone from
financial analysts to mutual funds, see MASTERS, supra note 51, at 37.
184. ZINGALES ET AL., supra note 165, at 5.
185. Hot Topic: Capital Flight, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2006, at A8. The number of class action suit filings
dropped in 2006, after some of the leaders in the class action bar were indicted. Nathan Koppel, Legal Bear:
Stock Class-Actions Fall, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2007, at C3. One of those lawyers pleaded guilty to the charge that
he had bribed plaintiffs to bring suits to his firm. Molly Selvin, Former Doctor Admits Scheme With Law Firm,
L.A. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at C3. The number of class action suits continued to drop in 2007. Class Actions, 39
SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1102 (July 16, 2007).
186. See, e.g., Damon Darlin, House Panel and U.S. Attorney Join H.P. Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2006, at
C1 (noting that Hewlett-Packard was under numerous investigations after it was disclosed that company offi-
cials had improperly obtained phone records in the course of investigating leaks by board members to the
press); Laurie 1. Flynn, Dell Delays Financial Filing as Accounting Inquiry Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2006, at
C3 (noting that Dell, Inc., was under investigation by the SEC and U.S. Attorney's Office with respect to its
accounting practices); Robert Guy Matthews & Jeanne Whalen, Glaxo to Settle Tax Dispute with IRS over U.S.
Unit for $3.4 Billion, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2006, at A3 (noting that Glaxo settled a huge tax case and that other
public companies have made large tax settlements for similar conduct); Peter Waldman & Don Clark, Califor-
nia Charges Dunn, 4 Others in H-P Scandal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2006, at Al (noting that chairman of Hewlett-
Packard indicted for illegally obtaining phone records).
187. Nanette Byrnes, Analyst's Report: You're Fired, Bus. WK., Nov. 13, 2006, at 9.
188. Carol Hymowitz, A Growing Number of Interim CEOs Add to Companies' Turmoil, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18,
2006, at BI.
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F. More Option Scandals
The SEC reappeared in 2006 with more disclosure requirements for executive com-
pensation."' An entire book was soon published to explain their operation."9
Those amendments arrived just in time to greet a new wave of options scandals
that commenced after a study by the Center for Financial Research and Analysis
revealed that options were being backdated on a massive scale in order to increase
executive profits.' 9' Executives at numerous public companies were caught in scan-
dals involving the backdating of their option grants.'92 Another study estimated
that some 2,200 companies had engaged in this practice. 3
Computer Associates admitted backdating options for periods of up to two
years.' 94 Broadcom announced that it had under-reported $1.5 billion in expenses
between 1998 and 2003 as the result of backdated options, and was restating its
accounts in that amount. Mercury Interactive announced a $525 million restate-
ment as the result of such practices. 95 UnitedHealth executives agreed to give up
$390 million in compensation from backdated options.'96 Cablevision Systems even
awarded options posthumously to a vice president through a backdating scheme.'97
189. Eric Dash, Pay Rules Adopted by S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at CI.
190. See SUE MORGAN ET AL., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
THE SEC's NEW RULES (2006).
191. Al Lewis, Backdating: A Scandal in Waiting, DEN. POST, June 23, 2006, at C-01.
192. Julie Creswell, Investigations Are Sifting Good, Bad and Only Ugly, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2006, at C1. The
chairman and CFO at Power Integrations resigned after being found to have engaged in such practices.
Broadcom announced a $750 million charge against earnings over the last five years as a result of options
backdating. The SEC and the Department of Justice were investigating these practices. Two executives at Bro-
cade Communications Systems, including CEO Gregory Reyes, were indicted for such practices. Floyd Norris,
Options Brought Riches and Now Big Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2006, at C1; see also Bed Bath & Beyond Will
Take Charge Related to Option Grants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at Cll (describing that the company took an
$8 million charge to earnings as a result of misdated options grants); Mark Maremont & Nick Wingfield, More
Questions About Options for Apple, ACS, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2006, at A3 (describing option grants to Apple
executives just before big jumps in the company's stock price, suggesting that they were back-dated).
193. Holman W. Jenkins Jr., How Backdating Is Like a 1980s 'Rockumentary,' WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2006, at
All; Carolyn Said, Options Scandal Grew Out of 1990s Strategy, S.F. CHRON., July 30, 2006, at Ft. Class action
lawyers were having a difficult time cashing in on this latest round of option scandals. Julie Creswell, One Route
Seems Closed, So Lawyers Try Different Lawsuit in Stock-Option Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2006, at C4.
Government prosecutions were also proceeding at a snail like pace. Karen Donovan, The Slow Pace ofJustice on
Options Backdating, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2007, at C2. The Delaware courts seem to be willing to find a breach
of fiduciary duty on the part of directors approving such practices. See Ryan v. Gifford, No. Civ. A. 2213-N,
2007 WL 416162, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2007).
194. Richard Waters, Computer Associates Admits to Backdating Stock Options, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 1,
2006, at 13.
195. Charles Forelle, Broadcom Sees Bigger Options Hit, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2006, at A3. The scandal at
Broadcom widened with charges of drug use and other misconduct by the CEO. James Bandler, Broadcom
Options Probe Shifts to Ex-CEO, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2007, at A2.
196. Steve Stecklow & Vanessa Fuhrmans, UnitedHealth Executives Forfeit $390 Million in Options, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 9, 2006, at B1. Another backdating scandal arose at Engineered Support System. Siobhan Hughes,
Charges Expand Options-Backdating Scheme, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2007, at A7.
197. Peter Grant et al., Cablevision Gave Backdated Grant to Dead Official, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2006, at AI;
see also James Bandler & Charles Forelle, ACS Officers Quit After Internal Options Probe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27,
2006, at A3 (explaining that the CEO and CFO resigned after backdating discovered).
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More than 130 companies were under investigation for this practice by October
2006.19 Those companies were in a broad range of industries spread across the
economy. 99 A subsequent study claimed that some 850 CEOs had increased their
compensation by an average of 10 percent through backdated options."° Another
study concluded that even outside directors, who were supposed to act as watch
dogs over management, were receiving backdated options as compensation.2"' Top
executives and directors were forced to resign at Apple Computer, Brocade Com-
munications, Brooks Automation, CNET, McAfee, Monster Worldwide, Power In-
tegrations, Rambus, Vitesse,0 2 BCGi, and Sanmina-SCI. °3 Steve Jobs at Apple
Computer was found to have selected dates for backdating, but was forgiven by his
company." 4 Even Chuck E. Cheese, the restaurant chain for children, was backdat-
ing, requiring its parent company, CEC Entertainment, to make a $30 million
restatement.
2 0 5
William McGuire, the CEO at the UnitedHealth Group, was forced to resign after
an internal report found that options had been effectively backdated.2 6 Though, it
was not exactly a brutal sacking. McGuire had been paid over $2 billion by the
company,27 including a retirement package worth over $1 billion from his stock
options (even after they were repriced to reflect actual values at the time of their
granting).2 8 McGuire was also entitled to a pension of $5 million per year, use of
the corporate jet, and a wide range of perks. Further, if the payments to McGuire
198. James Bandler & Kara Scannell, In Options Probes, Private Law Firms Play Crucial Role, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 28, 2006, at Al; Jeremy Grant, Groups Facing Stocks Probe Tops 100 Federal Investigation, FIN. TIMES
(London), Sept. 7, 2006, at 26.
199. Matt Kranz & Greg Farrell, Stock Options Scandal Spreads, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 2006, at 3B.
200. John Hechinger, Backdated Options Pad CEO Pay by Average of 10%, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2006, at A2.
201. Eric Dash, Study Finds Outside Directors Also Got Backdated Options, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, at C2.
202. Charles Forelle & James Bandler, As Companies Probe Backdating, More Top Officials Take a Fall, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 12, 2006, at Al.
203. Charles Forelle, Sanmina Employees Leave over Backdating, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 2006, at A3. Firings
continued at other companies. Rambus announced charges of $200 million as the result of options that were
improperly booked. Troubles Mounting on Options, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2006, at C6.
204. Nick Wingfield et al., Jobs Helped Pick 'Favorable' Dates for Option Grants-Apple Report Clears the
CEO of Wrongdoing, Blames Ex-Executives in Backdating, WALL ST. 1., Dec. 30, 2006, at Al.
205. Filings Delayed over Problems with Options, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006, at C9.
206. Eric Dash & Milt Freudenheim, Chief Executive at Health Insurer Is Forced Out in Options Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, at At. Interestingly, the practice was openly engaged in at HealthSouth as a means to
make up for its lower than market cash compensation scheme for executives. Apparently, no one considered it
to be a bad thing, and McGuire's resignation actually may have been forced because of undisclosed conflict of
interest that came to light during the probe. Editorial, McGuire's Options, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2006, at A14.
Stephen J. Hemsley, the executive who replaced McGuire, was subsequently found to have received options on
2.4 million HealthSouth shares when he was hired by the company in 1997. Those options were priced in-the-
money by $7.26 per share at the time of the grant. That was a nice bonus of over $17 million, but Hemsley
claimed that he did not remember focusing on that at the time. Eric Dash, Old Options Still Haunt an Insurer,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at Cl.
207. James Bandler & Charles Forelle, Bad Options: How a Giant Insurer Decided to Oust Hugely Successful
CEO, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2006, at Al.
208. Charles Forelle & Mark Maremont, UnitedHealth's McGuire Could Leave with $1.1 Billion, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 17, 2006, at BI.
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were treated as a golden parachute for tax purposes, McGuire was entitled to a
gross-up to cover that expense." 9
The founder of Take-Two Interactive Software, creator of the Grand Theft Auto
video game, pleaded guilty to falsifying documents in order to backdate options.' 0
Three executives at Comverse Technology were indicted for backdating options.2" '
One of those executives, Jacob "Kobi" Alexander made $138 million over a fourteen
year period from his options, of which about $6.4 million was from backdating.2"2
Alexander heightened this scandal when he became a fugitive from justice.21 Alex-
ander was arrested in Namibia, where he had transferred his funds, but was re-
leased on bail pending extradition proceedings.2"4 Extradition, however, was being
contested because Namibia has no extradition treaty with the United States. Kobi is
now a celebrity fugitive, joining the ranks of Robert Vesco and Eddie Gilbert.2
The SEC was targeting members of the compensation committee at Mercury
Interactive who had approved backdating options for an executive at that com-
pany.2"6 Some twelve senior lawyers at public companies were also fired or forced to
resign because of their roles in backdating options.2"7 The backdating scandal wid-
ened even further when it was discovered that options' exercise prices were being
changed by executives to obtain more favorable tax treatment.2t5 Charges were also
made that executives were engaging in massive buybacks of their own company's
stock in order to boost its price and provide more compensation to themselves as a
result of the increased value of their options.2"9 The SEC has adopted a safe-harbor
209. Id. It was later revealed that McGuire received some options twice, swelling his take by some $250,000.
Charles Forelle & James Bandler, How Did UnitedHealth's McGuire Get Same Options Twice?, WALL ST. J., Oct.
20, 2006, at B1.
210. Matt Richtel, A Guilty Plea for Options Backdating, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, at Cl. The general
counsel of Monster Worldwide also pleaded guilty to criminal charges. James Bandler & Charles Forelle, Bear-
ing Down: Probes of Backdating Move to Faster Track, WALL ST J., Feb. 16, 2007, at Al.
211. One of these executives pled guilty. Paul Davies, Executives on Trial: Comverse's Former Finance Chief
Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2006, at C3; Paul Davies & Mark Maremont, Sorin to Plead Guilty in
Comverse Backdating Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2006, at A3.
212. Tom Hays, 3-Ex-Execs at Comverse Tied to Stock Option Scam, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Aug.
10, 2006, at 9D.
213. Julie Creswell & Wayne Arnold, A Sighting, Perhaps, of a Fugitive in High Tech, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 28,
2006, at C1.
214. Charles Forelle et al., A Fugitive's Haven in Africa Turned Out to Be Anything But, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28,
2006, at Al.
215. Steve Stecklow, Executive Retreat: Stock Options Scandal Fugitive Puts Roots Down in Namibia, WALL
ST. I., Nov. 17, 2006, at AI.
216. Eric Dash, Who Signed Off on Those Options?, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 27, 2006, § 3, at 1.
217. Brooke Masters, General Counsels Feel Stock Options Heat Backdating Scandal, FIN. TIMES (London),
Nov. 28, 2006, at 24.
218. Eric Dash, Dodging Taxes Is a New Wrinkle in the Stock Options Game, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at
Cl; Theo Francis, Another Consequence of Backdated Options: Stiff Tax Bills, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2006, at BI;
Mark Maremont & Charles Forelle, How Backdating Helped Executives Cut Their Taxes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12,
2006, at Al.
219. Gretchen Morgenson, Why Buybacks Aren't Always Good News, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2006, § 3, at 1.
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
JERRY W. MARKHAM
rule to govern such repurchases and to prevent obvious manipulations, but that
rule does not prevent repurchases.22 °
One study concluded that between 2000 and 2004, backdating increased the av-
erage executive's pay at forty-eight companies by a relatively miniscule 1.25 per-
cent, translating to $600,000. The market price of those companies stock dropped
by an average of 8 percent or $500 million after disclosure of those practices.22'
That probably reflects a shareholder base that is still spooked by the Enron era
scandals. It is also evidence of the politics surrounding executive compensation,
which drives public opinion far more than its actual effect on company earnings.
Questions have been raised as to whether backdating is as pernicious as critics
claim. 2
22
Some companies were repricing the backdated options granted to executives, but
then compensated them for the loss in value for those options . 2 3 A mini-scandal
arose with the discovery that "spring loaded" options were being granted to execu-
tives just in advance of the announcement of good news by their company. 24 This
practice was apparently widespread. 25 Among those spring loading was Cyberon-
ics, which paid its executives $50 million in stock related bonus compensation at a
time when the company was losing money.226 The company also gave a former
congressman below market options three years before he joined its board, at which
time he became a member of the company's compensation committee.
227
Another popular practice is called "bullet dodging," which involves granting op-
tions right after some unexpected event has driven down stock prices.2 Corinthian
Colleges admitted that it had backdated options to take advantage of the rebound
in its price after the September 11 terrorist attacks. 29 The Wall Street Journal also
reported that some ninety public companies made large options grants to their
executives just after those attacks, at a time when stock prices were reduced by the
greatest percentage since the outbreak of World War II. The market recovered, gen-
220. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18(b) (1983).
221. Eric Dash, Report Estimates the Costs of a Stock Options Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, at C4.
222. Holman W. Jenkins Jr., A Typical Miscreant-II, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2007, at A12 (asserting that the
backdating scandals were overblown); Holman W. Jenkins Jr., The 'Backdating' Witch Hunt, WALL ST. J., June
21, 2006, at A13.
223. Charles Forelle, Executives Get Bonuses as Firms Reprice Options, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2007, at Al.
224. Floyd Norris, They Deceived Shareholders. Who Cares?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at Cl; Steve Syre, A
Step in the Right Direction, Bos. GLOBE, July 27, 2006, at Dl.
225. Gretchen Morgenson, Still Addicted to Options, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2006, § 3, at 1.
226. Elliot Blair Smith, Fortunate Ones; Insiders Made Nearly $50 Million Trading a Money-Losing Com-
pany's Stock, USA TODAY, Nov. 21, 2006, at 1B.
227. Elliot Blair Smith, SEC Filings Show New Chairman Got Options 3 Years Before Joining Board, USA
TODAY, Nov. 21, 2006, at 3B. The Delaware Court of Chancery has ruled that approval of such options by a
compensation committee would constitute a breach of fiduciary duties. In re Tyson Foods, Inc., No. CIV. A.
1106-N, 2007 WL 416132, at *5-6, 18 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2007).
228. Maremont & Forelle, supra note 121.
229. Charles Forelle, Corinthian Says Option Grants Were Backdated, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2006, at A2.
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erating huge profits to those executives.230 Of course, that action would appear to
reflect a commendable confidence in the company and the economy that the more
timid individuals did not share.
In all events, the options reform movement had been a failure of unbelievable
proportions. Indeed, the entire accounting system for public companies was cor-
rupted by this reform. Options, taxes, and disclosures all failed in curbing excess
executive compensation, so reformers looked elsewhere for some button that could
be pressed, or some bell to be pulled that would limit compensation to executives
at public companies. They did not have to look far. Franklin Roosevelt had shown
them another possibility-the prosecution of wealthy executives on trumped up
charges.
G. Criminalizing Executive Compensation
Franklin Roosevelt used his political speeches to conduct class warfare through
populist attacks on wealthy executives. Among other things, Roosevelt stated that
businessmen were a "stupid class,"23' and asserted in his inaugural address that
dangers from abroad were "trivial" relative to the "menace of corporation control of
American political institutions" and "organized greed and cunning. ' In support
of those attacks, Congress ordered the Federal Trade Commission and the Internal
Revenue Service to collect data on executive compensation, which was then pub-
lished annually. Companies paying executives more than $17,500 were denied cer-
tain government contracts, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC)
was prohibited from making loans to companies that were deemed to be over-
paying their executives.233 The financiers did not help themselves by their tax avoid-
ance schemes. Particularly troubling to the public was the fact that not a single one
of the incredibly wealthy partners in J.P. Morgan & Co. paid any income taxes in
1931 or 1932.34
Franklin Roosevelt's attacks on business during the Great Depression included "a
campaign of terrorism, with the tax law as a weapon" against those who opposed
his policies.235 One target was Moses Annenberg, a newspaper publisher who had
been attacking Roosevelt's economic programs. Roosevelt wanted Annenberg "for
230. Charles Forelle et al., Executive Pay: The 9/11 Factor, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2006, at Al; Mark Maremont
et al., Companies Say Backdating Used in Days After 9/11, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2007, at Al.
231. CONRAD BLACK, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT: CHAMPION OF FREEDOM 393 (2003).
232. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 150. Roosevelt has become an icon for preserving
American capitalism during the Great Depression. However, critics claim that his actions actually prolonged
the depression and that the American economy was rescued only by the outbreak of war in Europe. Amity
Shales, The Real Deal, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2007, at A15.
233. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 735, 765.
234. CANNADINE, supra note 4, at 514. It was not disclosed that the equally wealthy Franklin Roosevelt paid
only $31.31 in federal income taxes in 1932. Id. at 514. The Roosevelt administration later used the tax laws to
launch an assault on the J.P Morgan partners. See Comm'r V. Whitney, 169 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1948); BLACK,
supra note 231, at 394-96.
235. CANNADINE, supra note 4, at 515.
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dinner," and his administration threatened criminal charges that would result in
prison sentence of 147 years. Annenberg, who was dying from a brain tumor, re-
sponded that, like Nathan Hale, he did not "have enough years to give to my coun-
try." Annenberg pleaded guilty after the government threatened to also indict his
son, Walter." 6 Roosevelt failed in his efforts to jail Andrew Mellon, another wealthy
opponent. A grand jury refused to indict Mellon on tax fraud, possibly because the
Treasury Department thought he was owed a refund.237 A civil suit brought by the
Roosevelt administration on this tax claim resulted in the "notorious 'Mellon Tax
Trial' of 1935-36" that was prosecuted by future Supreme Court Justice and Nu-
remberg War Crimes prosecutor Robert J. Jackson, but it also failed.238
Prosecutions of wealthy executives on political grounds shifted over the years to
include all political opponents, whatever their stripe and whatever their wealth.239
The "independent counsel" law was thus used to criminalize politics in the latter
part of the twentieth century. The witch hunts that occurred during the Iran-Con-
tra scandal24° and the series of independent counsel investigations of the Clinton
administration that included "travel gate," "Whitewater," and Monica Lewinsky
were all about politics and not about criminal activity.' Prosecuting businessmen,
236. BLACK, supra note 231, at 394-96. One individual who was not prosecuted was Elliot Roosevelt, the
President's son, even though the Nye Commission, which was investigating waste and corruption in the war
effort, found that Elliot did not report $5,000 in income from a failed deal involving the sale of transport
planes to the Soviet Union. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, FDR 406 (2007).
237. CANNADINE, supra note 4, at 511-12. Mellon had himself used the tax laws to harass a political oppo-
nent while he was Secretary of the Treasury. Id. at 347.
238. Steve Forbes, The Man Who Made the Twenties Roar, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2006, at W4 (reviewing
CANNADINE, supra note 4). Mellon paid $650,000 in additional taxes. Surprisingly, Mellon had been prepared
to negotiate those items all along. CANNADINE, supra note 4, at 511- 12. Another wealthy executive that was the
subject of a failed Roosevelt prosecution was Samuel Insull. He had built an electric utility empire in the mid-
west but was targeted for a fraud prosecution after the company collapsed during the Depression. Insull fled
the country but was captured in Turkey and returned to the United States for trial. Although acquitted of all
charges, Insull was a ruined man and was later found dead in a Paris subway. The Roosevelt administration
also passed the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 in order to break up other utility companies
whose executives, like Wendell Wilkie, might pose a political threat to Roosevelt. AMITY SHALES, THE FORGOT-
TEN MAN (2007). The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 was repealed by the Energy Policy Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
239. The prosecution of business executives who oppose incumbent administrations continues elsewhere.
Vladimir Putin, the Russian dictator, borrowed a page from the Roosevelt book to prosecute and jail Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, the wealthy head of the YUKOS Oil Company for tax evasion. That prosecution was so biased
that President George W. Bush said that it appeared that Khodorkovsky had been "adjudged guilty prior to
having a fair trial." MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 41-42. Not coincidentally,
Khodorkovsky was a political opponent of Putin. When Khodorkovsky became eligible for parole, the Putin
government brought further charges against him so that he could not renew his political opposition. Robert R.
Amsterdam, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2007, at A10. The Putin government also went on a
clandestine rampage of murder and assassination against journalists and other opponents, culminating in the
fatal poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko in London with polonium 210. Alan Cowell, Britain Says Inquiry into
Poisoning of Russian Will Broaden, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2006, at A3.
240. BAKER WITH FIFFER, supra note 74, at 204-05.
241. See generally JAMES B. STEWART, BLOOD SPORT: THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVERSARIES (1996). Al-
though the independent counsel law was allowed to expire, independent counsel are still being appointed by
the Attorney General to prosecute political cases. The most recent example of that process is Scooter Libby's
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especially financiers, became a blood sport in the 1980s as a means for prosecutors
to gain political notoriety. Most prominent of this ilk was the jailing of Michael
Milken (the "junk bond king"), after it was reported that he had been paid over
$550 million in a single year by his employer, Drexel Burnham Lambert.242 Using
strong arm tactics, including indicting his brother and sending the FBI to question
his ninety-two year old grandfather, the government forced Milken to plead guilty
to some convoluted violations of complex SEC regulations. Milken was initially
sentenced to ten years in prison, a staggering term at the time, but that sentence
was later substantially reduced. That and other prosecutions of financial figures,
many of, which were reversed on appeal because of abusive practices and lack of
evidence, made the U.S. Attorney in New York City, Rudi Giuliani, a national fig-
ure. That prominence made him the mayor of New York, where he performed
heroically.243 Giuliani is now running for President.
Giuliani's victory over Milken would become the template for the prosecution of
celebrity financiers after the Enron and WorldCom scandals. President George W.
Bush and other members of his administration had some close ties to Enron and
were being tarred in the press for those relationships.244 This caused the Bush ad-
ministration to reject any governmental rescue effort on behalf of Enron.24 s To
quell that criticism, the President gave a tough speech on corporate misconduct246
and created a task force in the Department of Justice to pursue corporate scandals.
That task force attacked senior executives with a vengeance once reserved for drug
lords and mafia dons. As a part of that effort, Enron's accounting firm, Arthur
Andersen, was indicted and convicted for the misconduct of a few employees. This
destroyed the company and put 28,000 Andersen employees out of a job247 before
the Supreme Court overturned the conviction.24 S
In order to bring down the Enron executives, the Department of Justice needed
to break Enron CFO, Andrew Fastow. Fastow had initially refused to plead guilty so
the prosecutors indicted his wife, Lea, and demanded that the Fastows be tried
together so that their two children would be orphaned if they were convicted. That
conviction over a leak to the press of the identity of a CIA agent whose husband had filed a report critical of
the Bush administration's Iraq intelligence. Libby was not responsible for the leak, but was indicted and con-
victed anyway on the grounds that his testimony concerning his contacts with reporters was untruthful. Neil A.
Lewis, Libby Defense Portrays Client as a Scapegoat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2007, at Al. President Bush's commu-
tation of the 30-month sentence of Libby created another political storm. Independence Day: The Drama of
Bush and Libby, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2007, at A16.
242. See generally CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL: THE INSIDE STORY OF DREXEL BURNHAM AND
THE RISE OF THE JUNK BOND RAIDERS (1988) (describing Milken's junk bond activities).
243. See generally JESSE KORNBLUTH, HIGHLY CONFIDENT: THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF MICHAEL
MILKEN (1992).
244. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 85-86.
245. Id. at 86-87.
246. Id. at 447-48.
247. Id. at 205-12.
248. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005).
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worked, and both pleaded guilty even though the income tax charges were dubious.
The joint tax return that Lea filed with her husband thus failed to report the
$67,000 that Andrew treated as a gift from one of his co-conspirators rather than
income. Normally, payment of the taxes and a small penalty would solve such
problems, especially because the Fastows paid taxes on more than $60 million in
income that year. In spite of this, Lea was sent to a maximum security prison,
placed in an overcrowded cell and kept under harsh lights for a year so that Andrew
would know what was in store for him if he did not bring down the other execu-
tives at Enron, which he did.249
Another hardball tactic employed by the government was to subject arrested ex-
ecutives to the "perp walk"-in which the executive (the perpetrator) was paraded
in shackles in front of the waiting press." There was no purpose for such treat-
ment other than to humiliate those executives and to prejudice the jury pool.2"'
This practice reached its nadir with the dawn raid and perp walk given to John
Rigas, the 80-year-old head of Adelphia Communications, who was suffering from
cancer. 2 Violent criminals are immune from such public pillorying."'5 A federal
judge held the New York City government in contempt for handcuffing inmates for
transportation, even those previously found with weapons. Inmates could be hand-
cuffed only if a hearing was first held to determine whether such manacling was
necessary and whether it might be harmful to the inmates' health.254 Prior to the
Enron scandal, the Second Circuit also ruled that "a staged perp walk exacerbates
the seizure of the arrestee unreasonably and therefore violates the Fourth Amend-
ment.""2 5 Apparently, that rule applies only to common and violent criminals and
not to corporate executives charged with non-violent acts.256
249. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 109-13.
250. Herbert J. Hoelter, The Corporate Scandals; When Hard Time Becomes Just a Waste, NEWSDAY, Aug. 25,
2002, at B04; Those CEO Perp Walks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2002, at A18.
251. Jerry W. Markham, How the Feds Stacked the Deck Against Enron: The Justice Department Abuses Its
Mighty Powers, Says a Law Professor, When It Resorts to Any Cheap and Vicious Means to Gain a Conviction, CHI.
SUN TIMES, May 7, 2006, at B2 [hereinafter Markham, How the Feds].
252. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 328-29.
253. Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives Regulation in
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 319, 402-03 (2003) [hereinafter Mark-
ham, Super Regulator].
254. Cerisse Anderson, Correction Department Found in Contempt over Handcuffing, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 27,
2002, at 1.
255. Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 2000).
256. The Supreme Court set aside a death penalty sentence because the defendant had been shackled in
front of the jury during the sentencing phase after being convicted of robbing and murdering an elderly couple.
The Court held such restraints could be used during the guilt and sentencing phases only where there is some
strong security interest. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 633-35 (2005). That ruling came just a few weeks after
a violent offender killed his trial judge and three others after being uncuffed in a Georgia courthouse before
being brought before a jury. Shaila Dewan et al., Suspect in Court Killings Is Captured Near Atlanta, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 2005, § 1, at 24. Miami federal district court judge Marcia Cooke refused to allow terrorist suspect and
enemy combatant Jose Padilla to be handcuffed in court appearances even though no jury was present. Jay
Weaver, Padilla Judge: I Don't Want to Run a Prison, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 4, 2006, at lB. Padilla's lawyers were
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The government's next move was to stack the deck against any executive de-
manding a trial. This included issuing target letters or denying immunization to
witnesses that might aid the defense, such as was done to obtain the conviction of
Arthur Andersen, in order to keep anyone from testifying in favor of the defend-
ants.257 That tactic was also employed against the Enron executives and against
Bernie Ebbers, the convicted former head of WorldCom. The Second Circuit up-
held the use of such tactics against Ebbers. s' The infamous and now "odious""2 9
"Thompson Memorandum" named after its author, Deputy Attorney General Larry
D. Thompson, was also employed to smash corporate resistance to government
prosecutions. The Thompson Memorandum advised public companies that, in or-
der to avoid indictment for the accounting misdeeds of their executives, they would
have to "cooperate." Essentially, this made cooperation mandatory because an in-
dictment would destroy a public company.
According to the Department of Justice, cooperation means waiving the attor-
ney-client privilege, firing any executive targeted by prosecutors before trial or even
indictment, and cutting off their attorneys' fees even if those fees are required to be
paid by contract or state law.26° Federal district court judge Lewis A. Kaplan sharply
criticized these practices. Judge Kaplan found that the government had been "eco-
nomical with the truth" in claiming that it had not pressured an accounting firm,
KPMG, that was under investigation for tax shelter abuses to cut off the attorneys'
fees of the partners involved in those shelters. Judge Kaplan also faulted the govern-
ment for failing to produce required document discovery to the defense in a timely
manner, and he ruled that prosecutors had improperly pressured KPMG to coerce
two former KPMG partners into giving statements to investigators.26 ' Even the au-
thor of the Thompson Memorandum, after becoming counsel to PepsiCo, sug-
gested that it went too far.262 This mounting criticism pushed the Department of
Justice to withdraw some of the worst provisions in the Thompson Memorandum,
also claiming that pictures of him shackled and hooded constituted torture. Jay Weaver, Padilla Lawyers Claim
Images Cause for Throwing Case Out, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 5, 2006, at 5B.
257. Markham, Super Regulator, supra note 253, at 401-02 n.425.
258. United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 130 (2d Cir. 2006).
259. Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. I., Nov. 28, 2006, at A14.
260. Markham, How the Feds, supra note 251.
261. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 352, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also United States v. Stein,
440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 330-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Judge Kaplan dismissed the indictments against thirteen defend-
ants at KPMG as a result of these prosecutorial abuses. David Reilly & Paul Davies, KPMG Case Turns Sour for
U.S., WALL ST. J., July 17, 2007, at A3. The Department of Justice has also used "deferred prosecution" agree-
ments for some other highly questionable practices. In order to avoid indictment, which will destroy most
companies, corporations have been forced to use "corporate monitors" in the form of former federal judges or
government officials who take over virtual control of the company. As part of such agreement corporations
have also been forced to endow chairs at the alma maters' of the U.S. attorneys conducting the investigations.
Epstein, supra note 259.
262. Lynnley Browning, Former Deputy at Justice Dept. Would Limit Legal Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
2006, at C6.
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including demanding that corporations waive the attorney-client privilege or seek
to have companies not pay employee attorneys' fees,263
Nonetheless, there were other abuses. If the executives were not readily guilty of
an existing crime, prosecutors would simply make up a new crime to fit the case.
An article in the New York Times following the convictions of Jeffrey Skilling and
Ken Lay, the two principal officers of Enron, noted that prosecutors had no case
against those two executives when they began their investigations. The government
only was able to create a theory on which to indict them after two years of intense
investigation. In other words, they simply invented a crime. The prosecutors' "Do-
rian Gray" theory was based on an Oscar Wilde story about a man whose portrait
showed him as aged and corrupted, although he physically retained his youthful
appearance. The prosecutors likened Skilling and Lay to that tale on the ground
that they were presenting a vibrant face for Enron to the public while they watched
it crumble internally.
264
Martha Stewart was a particularly enticing target for abusive prosecutorial tac-
tics. 265 Stewart was interviewed by representatives of the SEC, FBI, and the Depart-
ment of Justice over an insider's tip that saved her a total of $46,000. Normally,
such an investigation would be conducted only by low level SEC staffers, but Stew-
art was a media celebrity and was targeted for prosecution solely for the head-
lines.266 True to form, her indictment for lying to the government over the reason
for sales led to a media circus.2 67 The government indictment included a "trumped
up" charge. The government charged that Stewart lied to investigators about the
basis for her trades in order to support the stock of her own company, which
would be hammered in the market if she were found to have engaged in insider
trading. This was a completely novel legal theory and novel theories are not nor-
mally made in criminal prosecutions, but all rules were off in the post-Enron hyste-
263. Lynnley Browning, U.S. Moves to Restrain Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at Cl.
264. Alexi Barrionuevo & Kurt Eichenwald, The Enron Case that Almost Wasn't, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2006, at
§ 3, at 1. The government's hardball tactics were lauded in a front page New York Times article. Kurt
Eichenwald & Alexei Barrionuevo, Tough Justice for Executives in Enron Era, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2006, at Al.
They had a fatal effect on Ken Lay, who died of a sudden heart attack on July 5, 2006 while awaiting sentencing.
Ironically, Lay died an innocent man because his conviction was still subject to appeal at the time of his death,
which meant that his conviction must be set aside and the government's forfeiture proceedings must cease.
Nevertheless, the government continued to threaten to seize Lay's assets. Greg Farrell, Trial Judge Vacates Con-
viction of Late Enron Founder Lay; Justice Department Still Plans to Pursue Forfeiture, USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 2006,
at 3B.
265. See generally CHRISTOPHER M. BYRON, MARTHA, INC.: THE INCREDIBLE STORY OF MARTHA STEWART
LIvING OMNIMEDIA (2002).
266. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 391-400.
267. Id. at 394-99. If Stewart had refused the interview with the government agents by asserting her Fifth
Amendment privileges, the case against her was, at best, weak. Indeed, Stewart settled the SEC's insider trading
charges after her conviction by agreeing to pay $195,000, and complying with a ban from acting as a director of
a public company for five years. The payment included a civil penalty of three times the savings she made on
the trade in question, which totaled $45,673. Press Release, SEC v. Stewart, SEC Litig., Release No. 19794, 2006
SEC LEXIS 1783, '1 (Aug. 7, 2006).
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ria. That charge was thrown out at trial, but Stewart was convicted of lying to the
investigators.26
Frank Quattrone was targeted by the government solely because of the $120 mil-
lion he was paid in a single year as an investment banker at Credit Suisse First
Boston.269 Quattrone was arrested for obstruction of justice and tampering with
witnesses in connection with an email that he had forwarded urging employees to
clean up their files in accordance with firm guidelines on document retention. The
email was withdrawn before any destruction occurred, but that did not discourage
the government. Quattrone's first trial ended in a hung jury.27 Federal judge Rich-
ard Owen then assured his conviction through constant one-sided rulings and bi-
ased instructions in the second trial.27' Before its reversal on appeal,272 "Quattrone's
conviction was aptly characterized as a 'judicial mugging' by a group of public
defenders. 273 After the conviction was set aside on appeal, the government agreed
to drop all charges.274
Richard Scrushy, the founder and chairman of HealthSouth, who was paid $260
million between 1996 and 2006, found himself in the government's cross hairs.
Scrushy was charged with orchestrating a $2.7 billion accounting fraud at Health-
South. Despite tape recordings and a parade of witnesses against him, including
most of his own executives, the jury acquitted Scrushy of all charges. 7 The govern-
ment could not take that defeat with good grace so they indicted and subsequently
convicted Scrushy of bribing the governor of Alabama. 76
Dennis Kozlowski was given a sentence of from eight to twenty-five years for his
excesses at Tyco.277 John Rigas, the head of the family that controlled Adelphia was
not so lucky. Rigas was sent to prison after being convicted of looting Adelphia of
$2.3 billion. Rigas was given a fifteen year prison term, effectively a death sentence
for that octogenarian cancer victim. 27 Bernie Ebbers at WorldCom, who was given
the largest grants of stock options for any executive during any five year period,279
was also given a probable death sentence. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed that conviction even though it noted that: "Twenty-five years is a long
sentence for a white collar crime, longer than the sentences routinely imposed by
268. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 394, 397-98, 412-15. Stewart came roaring back
after her imprisonment and resumed her high profile business activities. Landon Thomas Jr., She Came Roaring
Back; He Is Quietly Roaring, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2006, at Cl.
269. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 412-15.
270. United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 160 (2d Cir. 2006).
271. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 415-16.
272. Id.
273. Markham, How the Feds, supra note 251.
274. Harry Maurer, Quattrone Walks, Bus. WK., Sept. 4, 2006, at 25.
275. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 360-63.
276. Harry Maurer, Conviction of the Week, Bus. WK., July 17, 2006, at 25.
277. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 583-84.
278, Id. at 329.
279. Id. at 334.
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many states for violent crimes, including murder, or other serious crimes such as
serial child molestation.""2 ' Jeffery Skilling, the former CEO at the Enron, was hit
with a twenty-four year sentence, but the chairman of Enron, Ken Lay suffered a
harsher punishment, dying of a heart attack right after his conviction but before
sentencing.2"'
These harsh sentences were intended to have an in terrorem effect on corporate
excesses, but may have gone too far. In fact, terrorists fared much better than these
executives. Ahmed Ressam, the "Millennium Bomber" was caught carrying 100
pounds of high explosives intended for blowing up the Los Angeles airport. Ressam
was sentenced to twenty-two years, but this was too much for the Ninth Circuit,
which reversed one count of the conviction and ordered him to be resentenced on
the remaining counts. 2 John Walker Lindh, the American Taliban member cap-
tured in Afghanistan while trying to kill American soldiers, was given only twenty
years.283 Lynne F. Stewart was sentenced to a mere twenty-eight months. 4 Stewart
was the lawyer convicted of smuggling messages between an Egyptian terrorist, the
blind Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, and his followers.2"' The Sheik was serving a life
sentence for his leading role in the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 that
killed six people, and for trying to blow up other New York targets such as the
Lincoln and Holland Tunnels.8 6
This disparity in sentencing may be attributable to the "moral panic" that broke
out after the Enron and WorldCom scandals. 7 It is also difficult to argue with
success. The unconstitutional and disreputable acts by the government in its inves-
tigations resulted in over 250 convictions of executives (mostly by guilty pleas)
within a year of the creation of the Department of Justice task force following the
collapse of Enron.2 8 However, as will be seen, that moral panic and the draconian
measures employed by the government did nothing to curb the growth of executive
280. United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006).
281. Alexei Barrionuevo, Skilling Sentenced to 24 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006, at C1. Walter Forbes,
former chairman of Cendant was given a milder twelve years for his role in the giant accounting fraud at that
firm. Forbes was also ordered to pay $3.28 billion in restitution. Forbes Sentenced in Cendant Case, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 18, 2007, at B7.
282. Jennifer Steinhauer, Appeals Court Vacates Term of Algerian in Bomb Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2007, at
A13.
283. The relatively younger ages of those terrorists and their eligibility for early release further reduced the
severity of their sentences. Markham, How the Feds, supra note 251.
284. For Lynne Stewart, A Fairer Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2006, at A22.
285. Julia Preston, Sheik's Lawyer, Facing 30 Years, Gets 28 Months, to Dismay of U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,
2006, at Al. The sentencing judge justified his lower sentence by citing Stewart's long career of representing
violent criminals, terrorists, and extremists of every stripe. Id. In contrast, Bernie Ebbers had created jobs for
tens of thousands of individuals, but that commendable conduct was given no credit after his misguided efforts
to save his company failed in the economic downturn that cratered the telecoms.
286. Lynne's Grin, N.Y. POST, Oct. 17, 2006, at 28.
287. See Jose Gabilondo, Financial Moral Panic! Sarbanes-Oxley, Financer Folk Devils, and Off-Balance-Sheet
Arrangements, 36 SETON HALL L. REv. 781, 806-09 (2006) (describing the "moral panic" phenomenon).
288. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 448.
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compensation." 9 This criminalization of corporate governance failures was simply
another failed effort by reformers to seek some comeuppance on the part of highly
paid executives with failed business plans.
The current furor over the $187 million paid to Richard Grasso while he was the
head of the NYSE is another Enron era celebrity prosecution. In addition to
Grasso's package, six other NYSE executives received annual compensation over a
five-year period that exceeded $140 million. That is a lot of money.2" Unlike
Michael Ovitz who contributed very little for his $140 million compensation pack-
age for fourteen months work at Walt Disney, Grasso was a long time employee of
the NYSE who worked his way through the ranks without even the benefit of a
college education.
Grasso kept the NYSE competitive in the face of severe threats from NASDAQ,
electronic communications networks, and international trading. Despite that com-
petition, NYSE market share in the stocks that it listed for trading was 85 percent in
2001.291 NASDAQ lost 30 percent of its volume to electronic communications net-
works, while the NYSE lost only 7 percent. 91 The NYSE provided its specialist
members with profits of $2.12 billion between 1995 and 2000.293 The price of NYSE
memberships nearly doubled during Grasso's tenure and average daily trading vol-
ume increased from 179 million shares in 1991 to about 1.4 billion shares in 2000.
Grasso also forcefully reopened the NYSE after the September 11 attacks.
94
Those accomplishments were not enough to save Grasso. New York Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer, who was then running for governor, had received widespread
publicity from his prior assaults on Wall Street, and the furor over Grasso's pay
offered another opportunity for headlines. 95 Spitzer brought suit to recover
Grasso's pay on behalf of the NYSE's powerful and wealthy members. Spitzer sued
on behalf of the state claiming that the payments to Grasso violated the New York
not-for-profit statute because they were excessive. 296 Yes, the highly profitable NYSE
was a not-for-profit organization. Nevertheless, this seemed a strange role for the
attorney general, who generally champions the cause of the weak and unrepre-
sented and must have caused great amusement to the members of the NYSE who
include some of the most highly compensated individuals in the world.
Spitzer tried to undercut the successes of Grasso as a manager by filing a report
of an "expert" who was a finance professor at the University of Utah. The report
289. See infra notes 308-310 and accompanying text.
290. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 498.
291. Aaron Lucchetti, A Verdict on Grasso's Legacy, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2006, at C1.
292. Ken Hoover, NYSE Specialists Face Criticism as Anachronism in 21st Century; NYSE Defends System,
INVESTOR'S BuS. DAILY, Oct. 2, 2003, at A01.
293. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 500.
294. Lucchetti, supra note 291. After the furor over his compensation, the NYSE removed a plaque from its
walls honoring Grasso for that effort. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 500.
295. Editorial, The-Cut-My-Salary Standard, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2006, at A14.
296. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 499.
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noted that new U.S. listings on the NYSE dramatically decreased during Grasso's
tenure, that market share declined slightly, and that volume increases were compa-
rable to those on NASDAQ and the London Stock Exchange. 97 That, of course,
omitted the fact that Grasso kept the NYSE competitive from the harsh assaults of
the rapidly growing electronic communications networks (ECNs) and from com-
petition abroad, as well as keeping the antiquated specialist system in play. In that
regard, it is interesting to note that Grasso's successors at the NYSE folded their
hands in the face of ECN competition, merging with Archipelago Holdings, an
electronic exchange. The NYSE then went public and acquired Euronext, a Euro-
pean electronic exchange. In order to close that deal, the NYSE had to surrender
half of its seats to the Europeans, thus giving up control by Americans of one of the
nation's oldest and most venerated financial institutions. " ' The NYSE then began
transforming itself into an electronic exchange that was rapidly shutting down its
trading floor.299
More ludicrous was Spitzer's claim that Grasso had been able to trick his board
members into approving his pay by not fully disclosing its amount. 00 That must
have been a shock to those individuals. After all, Grasso's board members were the
heads of major brokerage firms and other financial institutions who fully under-
stood large compensation packages, themselves being on the receiving end of many.
More controversy was caused when Spitzer included the then head of the NYSE
compensation committee in the suit but did not sue that committee member's
predecessor who had actually approved the payments.3"' That omission was made
necessary because the latter was a powerful figure in New York politics, and his
support was needed for Spitzer's gubernatorial run.30 2
The NYSE incorporated as a for-profit corporation after its merger with Archi-
pelago Holdings.3 3 This raised the issue of who would receive the proceeds of any
recovery in the Spitzer suit-the incredibly wealthy former NYSE members or the
new shareholders who bought into the institution that Grasso had managed suc-
cessfully. The answer to that question now resides with the New York courts. One
state court judge has already jumped on the Spitzer band wagon, ruling that Grasso
had to return at least $100 million because he had not sufficiently informed his
board of the size of the package. The judge concluded that the incredibly sophisti-
cated and brilliant financers sitting on the NYSE board were either too stupid or
297. Aaron Lucchetti, Spitzer Presses a Fresh Attack on Grasso Tenure, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2006, at C3.
298. Gaston F. Ceron, NYSE to Split Board Evenly With Euronext, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2006, at C3.
299. Aaron Lucchetti, The NYSE: Faster (and Lonelier), WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2007, at C1.
300. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 499.
301. MASTERS, supra note 51, at 179, 183.
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too lazy to figure it out themselves, but the Appellate Division later threw out four
of the six charges brought by Spitzer, including some of his most crucial claims.
30 4
In all events, the fight over Grasso's pay is becoming a poster child for reasons
not to challenge executive pay in court. Grasso's lawyers were putting up stiff resis-
tance in the six cases pending against him in the New York courts. Discovery was
voluminous and appeals were being taken from many rulings even before trial and
attorney fees were estimated to be totaling $100 milion before trial.3" The taxpayers
of the State of New York were footing the legal bill for Spitzer's crusade, a bottom-
less pit that could be tapped at will by Spitzer. As attorney general, Spitzer had over
500 lawyers and an annual budget of $150 million to throw into the fight."6 That is
an unusual situation brought about by the anomalous fact that the NYSE was a
not-for-profit corporation and Spitzer brought the case simply to generate head-
lines for his political campaign. Shareholders do not ordinarily have those kinds of
resources to contest excessive compensation. Even class and derivative action law-
yers are discouraged by the huge costs of such litigation with recovery being prob-
lematic, as seen in the Ovitz case.3"7
The Grasso case did not, in any event, do much to slow compensation abuses.
Hank McKinnell, the head of Pfizer was paid almost $150 million in benefits dur-
ing a period when the stock price dropped by 43 percent.3"8 Nevertheless, McKin-
nell will be given another $200 million as a retirement package when he leaves that
company in 2007.309 That figure included $305,000 for unused vacation days."
Robert J. O'Connell, the former CEO at Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance was
fired for having extra marital affairs with two employees, for using the corporate jet
for personal use, and for manipulating his deferred compensation account by cre-
ating profits from backdated transactions. O'Connell was also charged with buying
a Florida condo from the company for himself at a below market price. Nonethe-
less, an arbitration panel ruled that these matters did not constitute adequate
grounds for a "for cause" discharge. O'Connell's affairs were found not to have
affected shareholders, and his other peccadilloes were either immaterial or could
304. Aaron Lucchetti & Joann S. Lublin, Grasso Is Ordered to Repay Millions in Compensation, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 20, 2006, at Al; Landon Thomas, Jr., Grasso Wins Some Rulings in Pay Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2007, at
C1.
305. Aaron Lucchetti & Paul Davies, Grasso Braces for Long Battle over Pay Ruling, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21,
2006, at B1.
306. MASTERS, supra note 51, at 46.
307. The government remains undeterred in seeking return of executive compensation paid on the basis of
manipulated accounting statements. The Office of Housing and Enterprise Oversight, which regulates Fannie
Mae, announced that it was suing former Fannie Mae executives to recover compensation paid to them when
Fannie Mae was overstating earnings by $6.3 billion. Eric Dash, Fannie Mae to Restate Results by $6.3 Billion
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have been easily rectified by the company. Since the firing was not for cause,
O'Connell was entitled under his employment contract to some $50 million. The
company has appealed that ruling?"
A jury ordered Metris to pay to Ron Zebeck $30.2 million for improperly remov-
ing him from his position as CEO. Zebeck was fired for incompetence and for
improper use of corporate funds. 12 Peter Dolan, the former CEO at Bristol-Myers
Squibb, was given a more paltry $9.5 million severance package after being fired for
mishandling patent litigation that resulted in $600 million in lost revenues. 13 In
Europe, four directors were indicted for awarding large bonuses to Mannesmann
executives for their role in dealing with a takeover offer. Apparently, such things are
just not done in Europe. Then again, the indicted directors were allowed to buy
their way out of the criminal proceedings by agreeing to pay about $7.5 million.3"4
IV. MORE REFORMS
A. The War on Perks
Another area of concern for corporate reformers has been the perquisites given to
executives that range from the free use of the corporate jet to tickets to sporting
events. This concern was heralded in the 1970s, after Henry Ford II was lambasted
in the press when it was revealed that he was using Ford Motor Company aircraft
to ferry his wine and the family's cats and dogs to various exotic destinations. On
one jaunt, Ford diverted a jet to pick up a package of cigarettes for a guest at a total
cost of $6,000 to the company. Ford also spent $300,000 of corporate funds on a
party that he hosted at a national governors conference.315
Even more entertaining is the SEC's 1980 case against Playboy Enterprises, the
publisher of the popular skin magazine and one time proprietor of night clubs
featuring scantily clad hostesses called "bunnies." '316 The SEC charged that Playboy
failed to disclose that Hugh Hefner, its founder and majority shareholder, was liv-
ing at the company's mansions in Chicago and Los Angles while paying only nomi-
nal rent and that most of his living expenses were being picked up by the company.
The SEC's complaint against Playboy described those luxurious accommodations
in detail, including the fact that the Chicago mansion had a dormitory that housed
up to thirty bunnies. Hefner was also charged with having used the corporate jet,
named the "Big Bunny," for personal trips. Although the merits of the case were a
bit doubtful, Playboy settled the case with the SEC without admitting or denying
311. Julie Creswell, Firing Chief Was Wrong, Panel Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2006, at C1.
312. Joann S. Lublin & Scott Thurm, How to Fire a CEO, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2006, at B1.
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the charges. In fact, the SEC must have been the only male dominated organization
in the country that was unaware of the fact that Hefner's lifestyle at the mansions
was being subsidized by Playboy, and that the company was using that life style as a
giant publicity machine.
Ross Johnson at RJR Nabisco in the 1980s created his own veritable air force,
consisting of about a dozen jets including two Gulfstream G4s that cost $21 million
each. This was accompanied by the "Taj Mahal" of corporate hangers that cost $12
million to build and another $700,000 to fill with furniture and art works. '1 7 Com-
pany directors were urged to use the jets for business or pleasure because, in John-
son's words, "I know if I'm there for them they'll be there for me." ' Johnson's new
headquarters for the company in Atlanta included a $100,000 lacquered Chinese
screen, a set of antique chairs costing $30,000, and a $50,000 Persian rug for his
office.3 9 Johnson lavished corporate funds on celebrities. Among others, O.J. Simp-
son, the famous football player cum murderer, was paid $250,000 for no-show
celebrity appearances.32° Johnson's excesses became a legend after he received a $53
million golden parachute as a consolidation prize for his defeat in a takeover bat-
tle. 21 That fight and Johnson's escapades became the subject of a popular book and
movie.1
22
The Enron era scandals reached even greater heights. Dennis Kozlowski, the CEO
at Tyco International, became infamous for purchasing and furnishing a luxury
apartment for himself in Manhattan that included an instantly famous $6,000
shower curtain. Tyco also paid $2.1 million for Kozlowski's wife's birthday party on
the island of Sardinia, complete with Jimmy Buffett for entertainment. Kozlowski
was convicted and jailed for looting corporate funds after these excesses were re-
vealed.3 23 In addition to those perks, Kozlowski was paid over $400 million between
1998 and 2001.324
The Rigas family who controlled Adelphia Communications also made headlines
with their perquisites. Among other things, they were charged with using corporate
funds to pay for an African safari and with using corporate jets for shopping trips
and to pick up a Christmas tree. The latter errand actually required two trips be-
cause the first tree was too short.325 Another world class party thrower was Lord
Conrad Black who headed the Hollinger International chain of newspapers. 26 Lord
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Black used corporate funds for his wife's birthday party at New York's La Gre-
nouille restaurant where eighty celebrity guests were treated to Beluga caviar and
sixty-nine bottles of expensive wine. Lord Black also spent $28,000 on dinner par-
ties for Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State." 7 Black was indicted and
charged with looting Hollinger through large unjustified "non-compete" payments.
He was convicted, after a lengthy trial, based on the testimony of another executive
who was the architect of the scheme and who had been promised leniency for his
testimony. Still, it was no slam dunk. The jury was initially hung, but after an Allen
Dynamite charge from the trial judge, Black was found guilty of obstruction of
justice for removing files from his office and for defrauding the company of a
relatively paltry $2.9 million instead of the over $80 million that the government
claimed he had stolen. The jury acquitted Black on nine other counts that were the
centerpiece of the government's case.32
Jack Welch, the venerated head of General Electric (GE), was paid $400 million
over a ten-year period. 29 In light of his managerial success, that figure met general
acceptance, but Welch was embarrassed when it was revealed in his divorce pro-
ceedings that he had been given many perks amounting to approximately $2.5 mil-
lion as a part of his retirement package, including tickets to sporting events, use of
a corporate jet, and a car with a driver. The SEC sued GE for failing to disclose
those perks in its financial reports." This type of SEC action will, of course, only
cause in retiring executives to demand higher payouts so that they can pay for their
own perks.
Corporate jet use became the subject of two front page articles in the Wall Street
Journal in 2005, one of which carefully charted the use of such aircraft for executive
golf outings in Florida."' Corporate perks remained front page news, as evidenced
by another Wall Street Journal report that News Corporation was paying $50,000 a
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millions of dollars in compensation and others stated that anyone receiving such amounts must have stolen it.
Richard Siklos, Potential Jurors Questioned in Trial of Conrad Black, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, at C2.
Ironically, Black was the author of a lengthy biography of Franklin Roosevelt that traced Roosevelt's prose-
cution abuses of executives in detail. CONRAD BLACK, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT: CHAMPION OF FREEDOM
(2003).
329. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE CRASH 56 (2004).
330. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 484-85. GE had other accounting problems of a
far greater magnitude. It had to restate $2.2 billion in revenues for 2002 and 2003. Id.
331. Mark Maremont, Frequent Fliers: Amid Crackdown, the Jet Perk Suddenly Looks a Lot Pricier, WALL ST.
J., May 25, 2005, at Al; Mark Maremont, JetGreen: The CEO's Private Golf Shuttle, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2005,
at Al.
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month to rent an apartment for Rupert Murdock, its chairman. Still, Murdock was
also being paid $25.7 million and could have doubtlessly demanded more in lieu of
this $600,000 perk.
33 2
Then there is David Wittig, the former CEO of Westar Energy. Wittig was paid
millions for relocation expenses, but never moved. Wittig spent $6.5 million on the
renovation of his office and $110,000 on window treatments on Alf Landon's old
house that Wittig had bought and renovated. For some reason, this Kansas home's
renovation also required a $1,200 bronze alligator. Wittig previously made the
cover of Fortune magazine for the $200,000 in compensation that he received as a
young trader at Salomon Brothers.33 The scandal over his misuse of company
funds at Westar was dubbed the "Enron of Kansas" affair. 34 Wittig also made prof-
ligate personal use of the corporate jet, including a family trip to Europe.
Wittig was indicted for failing to disclose his personal use of the corporate jet in
a questionnaire used by the company to compile executive perk's for disclosure
under SEC rules. Wittig's first trial over that charge resulted in a mistrial. The
retrial resulted in conviction and an eighteen year sentence. That verdict was re-
versed on appeal, however, and only a few counts were left for any further retrial.3
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals threw a lot of cold water over the government's
claims that personal executive travel was robbing the company. Government wit-
nesses claimed that Wittig's total personal travel on the jet was worth $1 million
based on the cost of comparable charter flights. The court of appeals rejected that
valuation method. Instead, the court concluded that the proper measurement was
the incremental additional cost of the personal travel over what the company
would have spent on the jet if it were sitting in the hangar. "Even when the trip is
solely for pleasure, the cost to the corporation may be modest. If the pilot is on a
salary and is not working overtime, the extra cost might be limited to fuel and
maintenance. "336
The Internal Revenue Service and Congress have tried to make it more difficult
to deduct the personal use of corporate jets, but that effort has not slowed executive
travel. Executives demanding the luxury of a corporate jet will willingly have their
company absorb those costs, so shareholders will only end up paying more in the
long run as taxes are ramped up and deductions reduced. In fact, airports are run-
332. What's News, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2006, at Al.
333. Stratford P. Sherman & John Paul Newport Jr., Why the Youngsters' Party May Be Ending, FORTUNE,
Nov. 24, 1986, at 29.
334. Karen Donovan, A Setback for Prosecutors in the 'Enron of Kansas' Case, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 12, 2007, at
C5.
335. Ashby Jones, Convictions in Westar Case Overturned, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2007, at AS.
336. United States v. Lake, 472 F.3d 1247, 1259 (10th Cir. 2007). Wittig had also been convicted in a
separate case of bank fraud and was sentenced to five years in prison, but the Tenth Circuit held that sentence
was wrong and should be reduced to between zero to six months. United States v. Wittig, No. 06-3166, 2006
WL 3378451, at *1 (10th Cir. Nov. 22, 2006). In the meantime, Wittig and a co-defendant were seeking $94
million in deferred compensation and severance pay after their dismissal from Westar for this conduct. Rebecca
Smith, Regulation: Westar Pay Battle Turns, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2007, at C9.
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ning out of hangar space for corporate jets, and such space for a single jet was
running over $18,000 per month per jet at one airport 37
Apparently, the same rules do not apply to government officials who are also
addicted to corporate jets. Eliot Spitzer, the New York Attorney General, has been a
prime critic of the misuse of corporate funds, but he conducted his campaign for
governor on a jet owned by a lobbyist with interests in New York thoroughbred
racing and who was seeking a gambling license in New York for an Indian tribe.
Spitzer was being charged only a nominal cost for the use of the jet.3  Of course,
crusading attorney generals who became governors have had a long history of re-
quiring the need for their own aircraft. Take the case of California Governor Earl
Warren who ran up 250,000 miles during the 1940s on a National Guard C-47 that
he converted to his own use. 9
Spitzer's crusades against Grasso's excessive pay, and excesses in corporate
America in general, must also be measured in light of Spitzer's massive family
wealth. That wealth brought attention after Spitzer was caught circumventing elec-
tion laws in his first race for attorney general by funding his campaign with mil-
lions of dollars obtained through his father34 ° whose real estate empire is estimated
to be worth $500 million. Spitzer's family wealth allowed the attorney general to
enjoy over $1 million in income annually and to be provided such perquisites as a
luxurious rent-free apartment overlooking Central Park.
341
That wealth and Spitzer's campaign finance abuses did not stop him from being
elected governor with a record vote.342 Indeed, the acceptance of his personal wealth
and lifestyle evidences the cynicism that prevails in the politics of executive com-
pensation. Many populist politicians are obsessed with inequality of wealth in soci-
ety but are themselves quite wealthy, e.g., John Edwards (the multi-millionaire who
lives in a 28,000 square foot house, pays $400 for haircuts, and vacations on Lake
Winnipesaukee); Hillary Clinton (who made millions through her book sales and
lives in a tony New York suburb); Ted Kennedy (who inherited millions from his
father); and John Kerry (who shares in the massive wealth of his wife). Some peo-
ple in America, especially those living below the poverty line, might have grounds
for questioning whether the wealth of those politicians is excessive, but rarely do so.
In fairness, if the excessive wealth of mere businessmen is to be criticized, seized
and redistributed should not those politicians also be forced to give up their great
wealth? For that matter even someone in the middle class might be the object of
envy by the poor. Does this mean that wealth should be required to be distributed
337. Elsa Brenner, Many Private Planes to Store, but Not Enough Hangars, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2006, at C6.
338. Editorial, Travels with Eliot, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2006, at A18.
339. JIM NEWTON, JuSTIcE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 201 (2006).
340. MASTERS, supra note 51, at 43-44.
341. Douglas Feiden, Empire of the Son-Spitzer Reaps Fortune from Dad's Real Estate Smarts, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Oct. 29, 2006, at 4.
342. Patrick Healy, Clinton and Democrats Sweep Top Contests in New York State, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006,
at Al.
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evenly? That experiment was tried and failed in the Soviet Union." 3 "In the words
of Trotsky, 'the socialist organization of the economy begins with the liquidation of
the market."' 44 But, "[a]bove all, socialization meant a state offensive against the
middle classes . ,, ." The Soviet's effort to evenly distribute wealth required the
forfeiture of civil liberties as well as the confiscation of assets and mass murders on
a scale matching those in Nazi Germany.346 In the end, there was only misery for all
but a few selected government officials.34
Another corporate reformer was Alan Hevesi, the New York State Comptroller
who was in charge of administering $120 billion in New York state employee pen-
sion funds, making him the largest investor in the United States.348 Hevesi used the
power that portfolio gave him to become a leading and high profile crusader
against corporate excesses. He was also a leader in instituting class actions against
corporate officials misusing their positions.3 9 Hevesi required the independent di-
rectors at WorldCom to pay a settlement constituting 20 percent of their personal
assets even though they had played no role in the fraud at that company.5 This
paragon of corporate virtue was caught using state employees to chauffer his wife
around, a practice he had engaged in for a period of three years.35 ' One employee
served as Hevesi's wife's personal body servant, providing such services as watering
plants, taking out the trash, hanging curtains and pictures, dropping off dry clean-
343. The leading philosopher on the equality of pay movement, John Rawls, advocated a "difference princi-
ple," which "ordained that inequalities in social and economic goods were allowable only to the extent that they
improved the condition of the 'least advantaged' members of society." David Lewis Schaefer, Justice and Ine-
quality, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2007, at A14. This therom allows wealthy politicians to claim that their wealth is
being used to empower the poor through the social policies they advocate. However, the "difference principle"
advocated by Rawls is in line with the Marxist approach to inequality as applied in Lenin's New Economic
Policy (NEP) that for a time allowed some free enterprise in the Soviet Union. However, even that limited
inequality proved too much for Stalin. Alexander Belozertsev & Jerry W. Markham, Commodity Exchanges and
the Privatization of the Agricultural Sector in the Commonwealth of Independent States-Needed Steps in Creating
a Market Economy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 125-27, 131 (1992).
A recent study suggests that upward mobility and not inequality of wealth is the driving factor in Ameri-
can society when it comes to economics. Arthur C. Brooks, The Left's 'Inequality' Obsession, WALL ST. J., July
19, 2007, at AIS. One commentator has blamed income inequality on cultural factors that fail to assure that the
children of the underclass receive an education adequate for them to receive a comfortable return on their
human capital. Brink Lindsey, The Culture Gap, WALL ST. J., July 9, at A15.
344. RICHARD PIPES, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 698 (1990).
345. BRIAN CROZIER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE 162 (2000).
346. RONALD HINGLEY, JOSEPH STALIN: MAN AND LEGEND 204-05 (1974).
347. Belozertsev & Markham, supra note 343, at 125-27.
348. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 643.
349. Hevesi was a "serial plaintiff in actions against corporations experiencing problems, including Bayer
AG, MCI Inc., McKesson, Raytheon Co., and Cendant Corp." Id. at 516. Hevesi, a Democrat, threatened to
bring a class action suit against the Sinclair Broadcasting Group if it did not drop plans to air a documentary
critical of Senator John Kerry during the 2004 presidential election. Hevesi claimed that advertisers might pull
their business if the broadcast went forward, thereby hurting revenues and causing a loss in shareholder value.
Sinclair then dropped its plans to air the program. Id. at 642-43.
350. Id. at 351-52.
351. Editorial, Ethics-Public and Private, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2006, at A6.
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ing, taking her shopping, and picking up her purchases. 52 These practices were
exposed by Hevesi's opponent in the 2006 election. 3 To quell criticism, Hevesi
agreed to repay the state over $200,000 and was reelected by a wide margin. 54 In
spite of this, the scandal did not die, and New York attorney general and governor
elect Eliot Spitzer vowed to pursue the case. Hevesi then agreed to plead guilty to a
single felony count, allowing him to avoid multiple charges of fraud. Unlike the life
sentences given to Enron era corporate executives, Hevesi will serve no jail time. 55
The use of corporate jets by members of Congress became a centerpiece of the
Democratic Party's platform that brought them back into control of both the
House and Senate in 2006.356 The newly ordained Democrat House Speaker, Nancy
Pelosi, then rammed rules changes through the House that would prevent members
of the House from hitching rides on corporate jets. 57 After enacting those "re-
forms," Pelosi demanded that the Department of Defense provide her with a jumbo
jet so that she could fly herself, her staff, and family and friends around the
country.
358
B. Alternate Compensation and Other Reforms
After the options scandals, reformers began suggesting that longer term incentives
are needed. IBM announced that it would no longer grant options to outside direc-
tors. Instead their annual compensation was doubled to $200,000. 3s9 This reflected
a growing trend away from options for directors.36 Some companies began experi-
menting with restricted stock. 6' It provided less incentive than options, but execu-
tives would still receive value from the stock even where it declines in value, short
352. Michael Cooper, Hevesi Pleads Guilty to a Felony and Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, at BI.
353. Id.
354. Diane Cardwell et al., Despite Accusations, Hevesi Is Re-elected New York's Comptroller, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2006, at P14.
355. Michael Cooper, Hevesi to Resign and Avoid Jail, Official Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2006, at Al.
356. In years past, the use of chauffeured limousines and other perks by high level government officials was
a favorite target of reformist members of Congress. John S. Lang & Robert Barr, How VIP's Live High at
Taxpayers' Expense, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 3, 1982, at 40. Particularly amusing was Senator William
Proxmire's efforts in that field. During his daily run to his congressional office, the Senator would peek into
government limousines to see who was being driven to work. Senator Proxmire even convinced the Senate to
ban the use of chauffeured limousines for all but a few government officials. Stuart Auerbach, Senate Votes to
Cut Limousines, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1973, at A6. That limousine witch hunt failed, but has now been re-
placed by the corporate jet bogeyman.
357. Reforms did not include more serious matters such as budget earmarks. Daniel Henninger, Speaker
Pelosi's Ethics, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2007, at Al2.
358. Margaret Talev, Pelosi Denies Lapse Over let; Republicans Allege Abuse of Privileges, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 8, 2007, at A3.
359. LB.M. and 2 Other Companies Will Alter Stock Option Grants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2006, at C9.
360. Joann S. Lublin & William M. Bulkeley, IBM Ends Director Stock Options, Spotlighting Popular Perk's
Decline, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2006, at Al.
361. Rob Wells, Politics & Economics: Senate Panel Hears Testimony on Stock-Option Pricing Abuses, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 7, 2006, at A8.
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of bankruptcy.362 Such grants require executives to remain with the company for
some period of time and provide an incentive to increase the value of the com-
pany's stock over the long term. Nevertheless, such reforms are being circumvented
by sophisticated financial tools. For example, executives at public companies were
using "prepaid variable forward contracts" to sell their stock holdings and gain tax
advantages. In one such transaction, Don Ackerman, chairman of WCI Communi-
ties, received $14 million from an investment banker for a base amount of 500,000
shares of his company's stock to be delivered three years later. The number of
shares to be delivered would be reduced if their share price increased, but would
not have to deliver more if share prices fell.363
In another reform effort, the SEC broadened its efforts to curb executive com-
pensation in 2006. Those requirements sought to, once again, attack excess com-
pensation through more disclosure. The topic was a hot one, as evidenced by the
over 20,000 comment letters received by the SEC on its proposed changes. The
amendments as adopted expanded the types of executives whose compensation
must be disclosed to include the principal executive officers, principal financial
officers, other high paid executives and members of the board of directors.364
The SEC ran into controversy after it was noted that, as originally proposed, the
rules would have required disclosure of the salaries of high paid television anchors
and sports stars. This was quickly dubbed the Katie Couric amendment, but the
agency backed off to require only disclosure of those employees with executive re-
sponsibilities. 6 ' The SEC in a "Christmas surprise," also changed these rules a few
months after their adoption to allow executives to report less compensation from
their options, resulting in a front page editorial in the New York Times and a follow-
up piece condemning that action.366
The SEC's demand for full disclosure of executive salaries is a really bad idea.
One of the most closely guarded secrets in the corporate world is the compensation
of non-hourly employees. Why is that? It is because disclosure would reveal inequi-
362. Lublin & Thurm, supra note 48.
363. Serena Ng, Filing Footnote: This Insider Sale Helps Hedge Bets, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2006, at Cl.
364. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 8732A, Exchange
Act Release No. 54,302A, Investment Co. Release Act No. 27,444A (Aug. 29, 2006), available at http://www.
sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf. In adopting the amendments, the SEC stated that:
The amendments to the compensation disclosure rules are intended to provide investors with a
clearer and more complete picture of compensation to principal executive officers, principal financial
officers, the other highest paid executive officers and directors. Closely related to executive officer and
director compensation is the participation by executive officers, directors, significant shareholders
and other related persons in financial transactions and relationships with the company. We are also
adopting revisions to our disclosure rules regarding related party transactions and director indepen-
dence and board committee functions.
Id.
365. Eric Dash, Pay Rules Adopted by S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at Cl.
366. Floyd Norris, Does S.E.C. Know What It Is Doing?, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 29, 2006, at Cl; Floyd Norris,
S.E.C. Alters Way to Show Bosses' Pay, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 2006, at Cl.
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ties in pay brought about by hard work, brilliance, management skills, seniority,
strong mentors or just plain unfairness. Disclosure would result in a loss of morale
as each employee compares and view his or her self with other employees. Any
employee receiving less than someone they view to be inferior will become disgrun-
tled. Some employees will quit, others will demand more pay and others will sim-
ply lose interest in their jobs. The result will be increases in pay as each employee
demands more than that being received by another employee deemed inferior and
that will then set off another round of dissatifaction and result in a continuing
upward spiral of pay.36 The only solution for compensation at lower executive
levels would then be a stratified compensation structure for those employees,
which would provide no incentive for hard work, brilliance, or management skills
and undermine the advancement of business.
As it is, at the upper executive level full disclosure has already touched off a wave
of competition for higher amounts of compensation. The SEC's executive compen-
sation disclosure requirements only encourage competition for larger compensa-
tion packages.36 Certainly, the expansion of the number of executives that must
disclose their compensation under the SEC's recent rule amendments will only
widen the demands forever increasing compensation and prerequisites. Executive A
will see that the pay of Executive B at a competitior is higher than his own. Execu-
tive A is convinced he is worth much more than that "incompetent" and will de-
mand a substantial increase from his board, which will cause Executive B to best
that amount. Similarly, Executive C will have a unique perk that Executive D's
compensation consultant spots in an SEC disclosure form. Executive D will then
demand the same perk with some additional bell or whistle, which will then be
copied and "improved" by others.
Disclosure failed in the past, so why does the SEC think it will now succeed?369
One study found that the five highest paid executives at the 1500 largest publicly
owned firms were paid $122 billion between 1999 and 2003."' 0 What will it be five
years from now? A survey of the compensation for the CEOs at sixty-nine of the
largest companies in the United States in 2002 saw a rise of 15 percent. Seventeen
CEOs saw their restricted stock grants increase by 73 percent.3 ' To be sure after all
the Enron era scandals, option grants declined in 2003 by almost 50 percent,372 and
367. Employees are already using the Internet to gather information on comparable salaries in order to
boost their case for an increase in pay. Damon Darlin, Using Web to Get Boss to Pay More, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
2007, at Cl.
368. Stephen Labaton, Spotlight on Pay Could Be a Wild Card, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, § 3, at 1.
369. Some companies were window dressing their financial statements after the SEC adopted new rules by
announcing that they were limiting the use of the corporate jets for personal jaunts and even cutting payments
for country club dues. Erin White & Joann S. Lublin, Full Disclosure: Companies Trim Executive Perks to Avoid
Glare, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2007, at Al.
370. Jack Rasmus, Executive Pay in the U.S.: CEOs Take the Money and Run, Z MAGAZINE ONLINE, Apr. 19,
2006, http://zmagasite.zmag.org/Apr2006/rasmuspr0406.html.
371. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 469.
372. Lublin & Thurm, supra note 48.
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a survey of compensation paid to CEOs in 2003 saw a decrease in compensation to
those officers, down to an average of $8.6 million in payments.373 Still, those pay-
ments were equal to almost 10 percent of those companies' net income. 74 In any
event, the decline in executive compensation in 2003 was only temporary. Average
CEO compensation rose 27 percent in 2005 from the prior year,3 7' reaching an
average of $10.5 million.376 Another study found that American CEOs were paid
431 times more than the average worker in 2004, up from 142 times more than the
average worker in 1994, 7' and thirty-six times the average worker in 1976.37' Those
numbers should be compared to compensation in the United Kingdom where
CEOs were only paid ninety-eight times that of an average employee. But the Brits
are gaining, as that figure was up 2500 percent in just five years."
Some of the packages for the Americans were impressive." Richard Fuld, CEO
at Lehman Brothers Holdings, was given a 10-year package valued at $180 million.
It was boosted by changing the terms of prior stock grants.3 ' Reuben Mark at
Colgate Palmolive received $141 million-in 2003. Steven Jobs, the options backdater
at Apple Computer, received $74 million, and George David at United Technologies
received $70 million. John F. Antioco at Blockbuster was paid almost $20 million in
salary between 1999 and 2004 in addition to the uncounted millions in stock op-
tions. Blockbuster lost $3 billion during the period that he was receiving that
remuneration. 2
If further proof is needed that executive compensation is spiraling up, notwith-
standing SEC full disclosure, consider the fact that the Forbes magazine list of the
400 richest Americans did not include a single millionaire in 2006. They were all
billionaires.3"3 Gross cases continued. Barry Diller CEO of IAC/Interactive was paid
373. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 469.
374. Rasmus, supra note 370.
375. Eric Dash, C.E.O. Pay Keeps Rising, and Bigger Rises Faster, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, § 3, at 5.
376. Lublin & Thurm, supra note 48.
377. Rana Foroohar with Barrett Sheridan, Are. They Worthy?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 2006, at B0.
378. Lublin & Thurm, supra note 48. There was, however, a significant surge in the real average wage of the
ordinary worker in 2006-rising by more than 2 percent. David Leonhardt, It's the Year to Keep an Eye on
Paychecks, N.Y. TIMES, )an. 3, 2007, at CI.
379. Nicholas Timmins, Escalating Pay Gap Is Socially Divisive and Economically Harmful, Says TUC Chief,
FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 6, 2006, at 2.
380. For an interesting analysis of executive employment contracts at public companies, see Stewart J.
Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives
Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231 (2006).
381. Randall Smith, Lehman CEO's $186 Million Haul, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2006, at Cl.
382. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 469-70. There were even some big payouts at
some universities. For example, Harvard University paid the two mangers of its endowment fund $35 million
each in 2003, but reduced their compensation by $10 million each in 2004. Id.
383. Vinnee Tong, Forbes' Richest Americans List Only Has Room for Billionaires This Year, NAPLES DAILY
NEWS, Sept. 22, 2006, at El. For a defense of billionaires, see Arthur C. Brooks, What's Wrong With Billionaires?
WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2007, at A13. The 100,000 wealthiest persons, i.e., those with over $30 million in invest-
able asssets, saw their wealth increase by 16.8 percent in 2006. Peter Thai Larsen, Super-Rich Widen Wealth Gap
by Taking More Risks, FIN. TIMES (London), June 28, 2007 at 13.
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$469.7 million in 2005.3"4 According to the Wall Street Journal, Diller was also the
leading jet set executive in 2004, running up an $832,000 tab on the corporate jet.8'
A front page story in the New York Times in May 2006 showcased the $245 mil-
lion paid by Home Depot to CEO Robert Nardelli, whose company's stock price
was stagnating.3 6 Home Depot also announced that it had backdated stock options
over a 20-year period, resulting in understating executive compensation by $200
million." 7 Some shareholders were revolting due to the poor performance. To quell
that opposition, the company announced a $3 billion buyback of its own stock in
order to boost its price.3 8 That effort failed and Nardelli, a former star executive at
General Electric, abruptly resigned as 2007 began.3"9 Home Depot's stock had
dropped by 15 percent during his tenure, while its chief competitor's stock, Lowes,
nearly tripled.39° Nardelli's successor was paid a more modest $8.9 million for his
first year on the job. 9 ' Of course the average worker might think even that amount
is excessive.
Excessive executive compensation for CEOs is now another favorite politically
correct crusade.392 There are almost daily reports in major newspapers, often front
page stories, on some excess in executive compensation. Those attacks drove Presi-
dent George W. Bush to deliver a Wall Street address in which he charged that
action was needed by board directors to curb executive compensation by tying it to
performance,393 a goal that had already proved disastrous with the stock option
384. Geraldine Fabrikant, Diller, a Late Entry, Takes the Prize for Highest Paid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2006, at
CI. Diller was anything but repentant after these figures were announced. Diller also said that compensation
consultants should be "flushed into New York's East River." Ironically, his own company used such consultants
to justify his package. Geraldine Fabrikant, Think Before You Flush, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2006, § 3, at 2.
385. See supra note 331.
386. Julie Creswell, With Links to Home Depot Board, Chief Saw Pay Soar as Stock Fell, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2006, at Al. One executive, Sumner Redstone at Viacom, had his salary reduced and his deferred compensation
of nearly $10 million was changed to a performance based arrangement. Geraldine Fabrikant, Redstone Takes a
Cut in His Salary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at Cl. Apparently, he had money to spare since his wealth was
then valued at $7.5 billion. Matthew Miller, Entertainment, One of America's Largest Exports, Serves as a Global
Platform for Profit for These Moguls, FORBES, Oct. 9, 2006, at 194.
387. Ann Zimmerman, Home Depot Backdated Options From 1981 to 2000, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2006, at A3.
388. Charles Duhigg, Investor Seeks Review of Home Depot's Management, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 19, 2006, at C3.
389. Joann S. Lublin et al., Moving Out: Behind Nardelli's Abrupt Exit, WALL ST. 1., Jan. 4, 2007, at Al.
Another GE executive, Gary C. Wendt, had been recruited by Conseco. It declared bankruptcy after two years
of his guidance, but Wendt retired with a package of almost $80 million from the company. Claudia H.
Deutsch, G.E. Magic Can Fade, after G.E., N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 4, 2007, at Cl.
390. Lublin et al., supra note 389.
391. Home Depot Chiefs Pay in 2007 Could Reach $8.9 million, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2007, at C7.
392. Kaja Whitehouse, Investors Likely to Raise Pressure on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2006, at C7.
The Wall Street Journal ran an entire section on executive pay in April 2007 with the lurid introduction that:
"Outrage over executive compensation has hit a boiling point. And it may get worse before it gets better." Joann
S. Lublin, Ten Ways to Restore Investor Confidence in Compensation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2007, at RI. The New
York Times also ran a "Special Report" on executive pay on the preceding day in its Sunday Business Section.
Eric Dash, Executive Pay: A Special Report, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, § 3, at 1.
393. Jim Rutenberg, Bush Tells Wall St. to Rethink Pay Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at CI 1.
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reform. Notably, the President eschewed government intervention394 and his hec-
toring probably will have little effect. Even the New York Times conceded that exec-
utive compensation continues to spiral up despite all the efforts of reformers.39
An example of the sensationalism in the press was the coverage of the abrupt
resignation of Robert Nardelli from his position as CEO at Home Depot on Janu-
ary 3, 2007. That announcement made the front pages of both the Wall Street Jour-
naP96 and the New York Times,3 97 consuming much of the New York Times Business
section,398 and creating fodder for follow-up stories.399 Corporate governance re-
formers were calling his resignation a victory,"° but Nardelli left with an exit pack-
age valued at $210 million, including a $20 million bonus for being a good sport
about his dismissal.4' That was in addition to the $63.5 million that Nardelli was
paid while in office.40 2
Excessive executive compensation even found its way into the 2004 Congres-
sional elections as a campaign issue.4 3 Those concerns did not slow the flow of
executive compensation, particularly on Wall Street, which had a very good year in
2006. In fact, it was so good that one enterprising company hired an attractive
model to stand in front of Goldman Sachs' offices and hand out $1,000 discount
coupons on corporate jet leases. 4 A shortage of $250,000 Ferraris was also re-
ported." 5 Among those receiving generous packages was Lloyd C. Blanffein, CEO
of Goldman Sachs. Blanffein was paid $54 million, which set a new record for Wall
Street CEOs. 4"6 His two deputies also received over $50 million.417 Stanley O'Neal at
Merrill Lynch was paid $48 million. The top five executives at that firm received a
394. Caroline Daniel & Jeremy Grant, Success Must Dictate Bosses' Pay, Says Bush, FIN. TIMES (London),
Feb. 1, 2007, at 5.
395. Eric Dash, Compensation Experts Offer Ways to Help Curb Executive Salaries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
2006, at Cl.
396. Lublin et al., supra note 389.
397. Julie Creswell & Michael Barbaro, Home Depot Board Ousts Chief Saying Goodbye with Big Check, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2007, at Al.
398. See, e.g., Deutsch, supra note 389; Gretchen Morgenson, A Warning Shot by Investors to Boards and
Chiefs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2007, at Cl [hereinafter Morgenson, A Warning Shot].
399. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, More $200 Million Parachutes? Don't Be Shocked, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
2007, § 3, at 1 [hereinafter Morgenson, More $200 Million Parachutes].
400. Charles Duhigg, Gadflies Get Respect, and Not just at Home Depot, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, at C1.
401. Morgenson, A Warning Shot, supra note 398; Alan Murray, Behind Nardelli's Abrupt Exit, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 4, 2007, at Al.
402. Morgenson, More $200 Million Parachutes, supra note 399. Nardelli was later hired by private equity to
run Chrysler. Micheline Maynard, Once Tainted, Now Handed Chrysler Keys, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at Al.
403. Gretchen Morgenson, Executive Pay Becomes Political, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2006, § 3, at 1.
404. Jenny Anderson, Wall St. Bonuses: So Much Money, Too Few Ferraris, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2006, at Al.
It was a good year for the investment banks. They earned some $80 billion in fees. Dennis K. Berman, Best Bet
Against Risk Further Down the Road May Be Wall Street Gig, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2007, at Cl.
405. Berman, supra note 404.
406. Jenny Anderson, Goldman Chairman Gets a Bonus of $53.4 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2006, at C2.
407. Ed Welsch, At Goldman, Two More Officials Revealed as $50 Million Men, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2007, at
C3.
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total of $172 million in compensation for 2006.4"' Nevertheless, "[c]ompensation
for top private equity bankers and hedge fund managers is likely to far outstrip
even the huge pay-outs going to Wall Street chief executives, according to
analysts."4 °9
C. Proxy Votes
Another Fabian dream is to give shareholders more power to curb excessive com-
pensation through the proxy voting machinery. Peter Wallison, a fellow at the
American Enterprise Institute, has challenged the whole reformist concept of using
the proxy vote to create grass roots system corporate democracy. Wallison contends
that public corporations are not political units. They are organizations created to
separate ownership and control so that shareholder wealth can be maximized.41° As
Professor Henry Manne notes, "the modern corporation is a market creation, not a
political one." ''
The pitfalls of proxy fights to control executive compensation is well illustrated
by a proxy fight that occurred in the 1950s at Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp.
There, the founder of the company challenged a large payout to the chairman who
succeeded the founder. That challenge was not cheap, requiring an expensive cam-
paign that included the hiring of proxy solicitors and counsel by both sides. Pre-
dictably, the shareholders ended up paying the expenses of both sides.4" 2 In any
event, the expenses associated with a proxy challenge involving thousands of share-
holders in a public company means that such challenges have been extremely rare.
The corporate reformers have sought to avoid the costs of a proxy battle by
proceeding through the free access to the ballot required by the SEC under Rule
14a-8."' That rule requires management to include in its proxy materials, at com-
pany expense, shareholder proposals that may be accompanied with a supporting
statement of less than 500 words. These proposals may be made by a shareholder
owning $2,000 or more of the company's stock.4 4 The SEC allows management to
exclude shareholder proposals if they fall within any one of a dozen or so catego-
ries, such as those pertaining to the ordinary business operations of the corpora-
tion, matters that involve a personal grievance, or a matter that is beyond the
power of the company to effectuate." 5
Corporate gadflies initially used this rule to push their sometimes eccentric agen-
das. Lewis and John Gilbert, for example owned small amounts of stock in over 800
408. Randall Smith, Merrill's $48 Million Chief, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2007, at C3.
409. Ben White, Megabucks Deals for an Elite Few Pay Rewards, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 3, 2007, at 22.
410. Peter J. Wallison, Are Corporations Democracies?, FIN. SERVS. OUTLOOK, Dec. 2006., at 1.
411. Henry G. Manne, The 'Corporate Democracy' Oxymoron, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2007, at A23.
412. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 291-93 (N.Y. 1955).
413. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-8 (2006).
414. Id.
415. Id.
VOL. 2 NO. 2 2007
REGULATING EXCESSIVE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
corporations and attended over 2000 annual meetings where they were "'[allmost
always outvoted, they are seldom out talked and never out shouted."' 6 The
Gilberts had some success in obtaining access to the proxy ballot through the SEC
rule in one case." 7 The Gilberts rarely prevailed in the subsequent votes because
most voters vote in favor of management."' The Gilberts were followed by the
"corporate responsibility" reformers who were pushing various social agendas
such as opposition to the Vietnam War," 9 the environment, 420 smoking,42' employ-
ment discrimination, 422 cruelty to animals423  and most recently executive
compensation.424
The effort at curbing excessive compensation through Rule 14a-8 must come
indirectly because the rule allows exclusion of proposals that violate law, which
would cover compensation packages that are subject to contract law.421 One indi-
rect method is to submit proposals, demanding that company's compensation
committee prepare a report on executive compensation or take other action that
will supposedly embarrass the committee into reducing compensation. For exam-
ple, the SEC staff required Wal-Mart to include a proposal in its proxy that would
require its compensation committee to prepare a report comparing the total com-
pensation of Wal-Mart executives with the total compensation of its lowest paid
workers.426 Another ploy is to seek an advisory shareholder vote on executive com-
pensation. Rarely will the vote carry the day, but the issue is guaranteed to generate
a substantial minority vote that will generate embarrassing publicity. Some sixty
companies were facing such votes as the 2007 proxy season began.427 The House of
416. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 99, at 567 (citation omitted).
417. SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948).
418. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 99, at 573.
419. See Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404
U.S. 403 (1972).
420. Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussing the timing
of a corporation's phase out of the production of chlorofluorocarbons and halons).
421. See, e.g., Aetna Life & Cas. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Exchange Act Release No. 40,018, Investment
Co. Act Release No. 23,200, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 5 79,705 (Feb. 28, 1991).
422. Amendments to Rules on Shareholders Proposals, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,108 (May 28, 1998) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
423. Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 556 (D.D.C. 1985) (describing the force feeding
of geese to produce pate de foie gras).
424. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 99, at 567.
425. See, e.g., Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 SEC No-Action LEXIS 239 (Feb. 27, 2000)
(noting the December 21, 1999 letter from IBM).
426. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 SEC No-Action LEXIS 303, *1 (Mar. 1, 2006).
427. Gretchen Morgenson, Roadblocks to Greater Say on Pay, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 21, 2007 § 3, at 1; Erin White
& Aaron 0. Patrick, Shareholders Push for Vote on Executive Pay, WALL ST. I., Feb. 26, 2007, at B1. A survey of
proxy votes on executive compensation proposals in 2006 showed that, with one exception, most were defeated
by overwhelming majorities. The single exception were proposals to approve future golden parachutes. Of
shares voting on golden parachute proprosals, 50 percent were for and 49 percent against, with I percent
abstaining. The percentage of outstanding shareholders approving golden parachute proposals had remained
stable over the prior four years (36-39 percent), but the publicity surrounding other executive compensation
proposals resulted in a doubling of the percentage of outstanding shares approving such proposals between
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
JERRY W. MARKHAM
Representatives has jumped on this band wagon and passed legislation that allows
shareholders to cast non-binding votes on executive pay-the "Say on Pay" Act.428
Even more subtly, another end around being pursued by corporate reformers is
through proxy proposals directed at the selection of the board of directors mem-
bers who would presumably act as a check on management excesses. The move-
ment has been led largely by union pension funds (most notably the California
Public Employee Retirement System (Calpers)). These pension funds have an
agenda even broader than limiting executive pay; they want to battle management
in the boardrooms through their pension fund stockholdings. That battle is made
possible by their large stock holdings and is necessitated by the fact that the unions
lost the fight to acquire power through job actions. The unions have suffered dra-
matically declining memberships (at least in the private sector).42
The New York Times supports the unions in this effort, but that support is com-
pletely cynical. Many of the largest newspapers, including the New York Times, the
Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal, have classified their stock to assure
control by the families who owned the companies,4 "' thereby excluding sharehold-
ers from having any voice on how to cope with declining readership.43" ' A Morgan
Stanley money manager criticized, and sought reform of the New York Times stock
classification arrangement after its share prices dropped over 50 percent. In retalia-
tion, the controlling shareholders at that newspaper pulled all of their assets out of
Morgan Stanley.43 2 Nevertheless, media companies, including some newspapers, are
being targeted for acquisition by professional managers who it is expected will im-
pose some discipline on their costs and policies in order to make them profitable.4 3
The board voting proposal has faced some obstacles, the most formidable being
the fact that Rule 14a-8 allows the exclusion of proposals that relate to board elec-
tions. 44 After the Enron era scandals, the SEC proposed a rule that would have
allowed shareholders holding 5 percent or more of a company's stock to nominate
directors, if a shareholder proposal approved by a majority of shareholders allowed
2002 and 2006, but interest in such proposals was still quite low. GEORGESON, 2006 ANNUAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REVIEW 15-16 (n.d.).
428. House Votes to Give Investors Say on Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2007, at B4.
429. Editorial, Board Games, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2006, at A12. The union pension funds are also using
their large stockholdings to become professional class action plaintiffs who sue with every blip in a stock's
price. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 637-43.
430. MARKHAM CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 372.
431. Katharine Q. Seelye, For Journalists, Politics Not as Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2007, at Cl (describing
the effects of declining newspaper readership on journalists). The Chandler family sold its newspaper interests
at a premium before the bottom dropped out of their newspapers. Joe Nocera, Of Taxes, Newspapers and
Family, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, at Cl.
432. Sarah Ellison, New York Times Controlling Family Moves Assets from Morgan Stanley, WALL ST. J., Feb.
3, 2007, at B3.
433. Jon Fine, Media's New Masters, Bus. WK., Nov. 13, 2006, at 26. Rupert Murdoch paid $5 billion to the
Bancroft family for the Wall Street Journal that they control through a classified voting arrangement. Joe
Nocera, How the Bancrofts Blew It, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2007, at C1.
434. See HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 99, at 596.
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it, or where 35 percent of votes were withheld in the vote to elect an incumbent
director. 3 The SEC rejected such a proposal in 1942 after members of Congress
claimed it was communist in nature. That proposal was again rejected in 1992, and
even in the midst of the post-Enron hysteria, its most recent iteration met wide-
spread opposition. The SEC received over 16,000 comment letters and even long
time corporate governance gadfly Evelyn Davis was against turning control of cor-
porate America to the labor unions who were about the only ones with sufficient
stock and interest to make such nominations.
3 6
The SEC backed off this proposal in the face of this onslaught, allowing the SEC
staff to advise registrants that they could exclude such proposals under Rule 14a-
8."' A labor union pension fund challenged that approach and was given a boost
by the Second Circuit in American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employ-
ees, Employees Pension Plan v. American International Group, Inc. 3 There, the court
held that an SEC rule excluding shareholder proposal that "relates to an election"
did not apply to a proposal to amend the bylaws to establish a procedure allowing
shareholder nominated candidates to be included on the corporate ballot. The
court noted that the language of the rule was ambiguous and that the SEC had
changed its initial interpretation of the rule without adequate explanation.439
The corporate governance reformers have continued to pursue other demands
for controlling the board. For example, they advocate removal of any director who
does not receive a majority of shareholder votes. Although under most state laws
only a plurality is required for election,44 the corporate reformers claim that with-
out such a majority approval requirement corporate board elections are no better
than those held in the Soviet Union during the days of Stalin.' The reasoning
behind that claim is uncertain because voters in the Soviet Union were given no
choice, although investors in America can mount a proxy fight if they wish; they
only have to pay for it and labor unions have enough funds to pay those expenses.
In any event, the lack of a majority voting requirement, at least in the popular vote,
has not impaired our democracy. Abraham Lincoln received only 39 percent of the
popular vote, and Bill Clinton received only 43 percent in his first presidential
election. The majority vote required in the Electoral College also did not prevent
435. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed Reg. 60,784, 60,789 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
249, and 274). This proposal stemmed from a SEC staff report recommending such action. Stephen Labaton,
S.E.C. May Ease Voting for Outside Directors, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2003, at C1.
436. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 637-43.
437. Id. at 639-40; Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Rebuffs Investors on Board Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at
C2.
438. 462 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2006).
439. Following that decision, the SEC published for comment two alernative proposals-one would allow
shareholders to seek by-law changes allowing more contested elections, while the other would not. Stephen
Labaton, A Public Airing for Propsals on Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2007, at C3.
440. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 7.28 (1999).
441. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 638.
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the election of four presidents, including George W. Bush, who lost the popular
vote.442
More importantly, corporate shareholders in public companies, unlike the citi-
zens of the Soviet Union, can vote with their feet by selling their stock and reinvest-
ing in the millions of alternate investments available to Americans. That is the most
effective vote of all, signaling to management that their pay is too high.44 The
corporate reformers were, nonetheless, given a boost after the head of Walt Disney,
Michael Eisner, failed to obtain the approval of 43 percent of shareholders in a vote
of confidence on his stewardship, an amount far greater than normally expected in
corporate elections. 44 Calpers and others claimed this meant that Eisner should
resign. Eisner refused to resign, but did agree to retire in two years.
The attack through the ballot box took other forms. Institutional investors, like
mutual funds, are being required to vote the shares that they hold. Since they are
investors and not managers, those institutions have neither the time, inclination,
nor the ability to tell management how to run their companies. They defer instead
to a cottage industry of firms that provide politically correct advice on how shares
should be voted.445 Where those groups acquire the expertise to tell management
how to run their companies is unknown. Another reform being pushed by the
labor union pension crowd is secret ballots. That is all too cynical because the
unions themselves are opposing secret ballots in votes taken to approve company
unions. Unions want an open vote so that workers can be better intimidated to vote
for the union, but that effort failed in the Senate.446
Requiring mutual funds to disclose how they vote portfolio shares seems to have
had little or no effect on management.447 Still another threat is a change in the
NYSE rules that will alter the way in which broker-dealers vote their customer's
stock held in street name. Previously, the broker-dealer would vote in favor of
management proposals unless the beneficial owner objected.448 The NYSE rule
change would prohibit the broker-dealer from voting unless instructed to do so by
the investor. As originally proposed, this rule would have applied only to votes on
stock option plans for executives.449 It was later extended to other matters, includ-
ing electing board members proposed by management.4 0 It is unclear what effect
this will have on quorum and other voting requirements, but it will certainly make
442. Id. at 640-41.
443. Id. at 640.
444. Id. at 263.
445. Id. at 640.
446. David Leonhardt, Worthy Goal of Flawed Bill: Aiding Unions, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2007, at C1; Kris
Maher, How Union Member Drives Garner Support, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2006, at A2.
447. The effects of this requirement remain uncertain. Kaja Whitehouse & Tom Lauricella, Voting Records at
Mutual Funds: Still a Hard Read, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2006, at C1.
448. See generally HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 99, at 577 (describing the NYSE's new procedure).
449. Phylis Plitch, NYSE Change Seen as Boon for Holders, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2002, at BI IF.
450. Big Board Moves to Change Rule on Proxy Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2006, at C12.
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it harder for management to manage. The mutual funds appear to be the ones who
will suffer the most from this proposal because their shareholders do not usually
want to vote or even be contacted about such things. Thus, the mutual funds will
have to incur some heavy costs and customer annoyance to put the materials in
their hands instead of just letting the brokers vote.45" '
The effort to transfer control from management to shareholders (union pension
funds) will continue to be the holy grail for corporate reformers. The regulators
and the courts now seem poised to hand over that control to the labor unions,
which have their own agenda that does not include efficient management, or to
politically correct consultants who have never managed a public company.452 Some
thought should be given to the effects of this turnover before it proceeds further.
V. WHY BOTHER?
A. What is Excessive?
The real issue in the debate over executive compensation is how to determine
whether compensation is excessive. The courts floundered over this issue in the
Rogers v. Hill453 litigation and over the years the courts have otherwise proved to be
unable to deal with what constitutes excessive compensation. Taxation and prose-
cutions have also failed to reign in executive compensation. Politicians and the
press continue to rail against excessive compensation. But is there really a problem
that needs addressing? Some studies suggest that large compensation packages cor-
relate to the market capitalization of many public companies, i.e., the larger the
company, the greater the pay. Although profitability may be the measure preferred
by many, compensation based on capital under management makes some sense
because the manager's skills are tested in assembling and managing a large enter-
prise. 5 ' Another way to judge value is to compare the pay at public companies with
the pay at non-public companies. The private (non-public company) sector pro-
vides a comparative base where self-interest would presumably preclude excessive
451. Judith Burns, Funds Seek Proxy-Plan Exemption, WALL ST. l., Dec. 22, 2006, at C5. In the interim,
several large brokerage firms have shifted their voting practices from following mangement recommendations
to "proportional voting" which means that the non-instructing shares will be voted in the same proportion as
the shares actively voted for or against a particular proposal. FYI-A Newsletter for Morgan Stanley Clients,
MORGAN STANLEY (Morgan Stanley, New York, N.Y.), June 2007, at 3. This preserves quorum and voting
requirements, but effectively acts as an abstention, a change from the prior practice of voting in favor of
management recommendations.
452. For example, Calpers unsuccessfully sought to unseat Steve Burd as chairman of Safeway after a strike
by the United Food and Commercial Workers Union. Calpers' president, Sean Harrigan, was the international
vice president of that union at the time. Harrigan also used his Calpers position to pressure other California
supermarkets to settle a union strike. MARKHAM, CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 644.
453. 289 U.S. 582, 584-85 (1933).
454. Foroohar with Sheridan, supra note 377. Studies also show that some underperforming companies are
over-paying their executives. Gretchen Morgenson, The Best and the Worst in Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 2006, § 3, at 1. That is but a statement of the obvious. Those managers are managing for themselves and
not for shareholders, so the stock price drops.
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compensation. Yet, James Simmons, a hedge fund manager, was paid an incredible
$1.5 billion in 2005.45s
In August 2006, VNU NV hired the vice chairman of the General Electric for a
compensation package valued at $100 million. This was not another instance of the
looting of a public company. VNU is owned by private equity firms and that
money was coming from the pockets of those sophisticated investors.456 In fact, the
Financial Times reports that executives at public companies are becoming hiring
targets for private equity.
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, the buy-out firm, says more than a third of its 29
top managers have experience as chief executive or chief financial officer of a
public company.
Marc Lipschultz, a KKR partner, said: "When they join private equity-
backed companies these executives can spend much more of their time on long-
term business building rather than on quarterly earnings.""
George Roberts of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) fame acknowledges that his pri-
vate equity firm allows managers to have longer time horizons. Roberts notes that
"[a] lot of [public] companies want to start new projects but they can't because
they are afraid of the hit to quarterly earnings, even though it may be right in three
to five years." '458 The New York Times even ran a front page story on this phenome-
non, quoting Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, associate dean of the Yale University School of
Management, as stating that, "'[y]ou regularly hear public company C.E.O.'s talk
about how they can make two or three times the money [in private equity] in what
they feel is half the effort because they don't have the same degree of scrutiny.""'
This talent search removed some of the best of the managers from public compa-
nies. At private equity firms they no longer had to worry about Sarbanes-Oxley and
SEC regulations that have sapped executive time, resulted in enormous expense,
driven foreign listings offshore, discouraged initial public offerings (IPOs)46° and
caused executives to abandon risk in favor of caution that turns their companies
into mere bureaucracies. Many talented individuals were also avoiding service on
455. Adam Shell, Some Hedge Funds Hit a Slump This Year, USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 2006, at lB.
456. Kathryn Kranhold & Joann S. Lublin, $100 Million Helps Lure Away General Electric Veteran, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 24, 2006, at BI.
457. Francesco Guerrera, Private Equity Talent Search Leaves Listed Groups Trailing, FIN. TIMES (London),
Aug. 30, 2006, at 1. Not all private equity pays so well since many of these entrepreneurs forgo salary for large
profits when they sell off assets. Nevertheless, the average employee at such firms was being paid $777,000 in
2005. Rebecca Buckman, Venture Firms Are Doling Out Large Pay Deals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2006, at Cl.
458. Henny Sender, Inside the Minds of Kravis, Roberts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2007, at C1.
459. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Eric Dash, Private Firms Lure Chief Executives with Top Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2007, at Al. Interestingly, the supposedly overpaid executives at public companies were out-performing private
equity managers. Edward Chancellor, Gauging Private Equity, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2007, at C12.
460. A surge in IPOs occured as 2006 ended. Lynn Cowan, Deals & Deal Makers New Year's Resolution for
IPOs: Keep Returning More of the Same, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2007, at C3.
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public company boards because of fears of liability. In light of Sarbanes-Oxley,
prowling labor union class action plaintiffs and ill thought out regulations, "who in
their right mind would want to sit on a corporate board these days?"46' Marty
Lipton, the renowned corporate lawyer, has charged that the continuing govern-
mental and other attacks on directors are making them risk averse. "We cannot
afford continuing attacks on the board of directors. It is time to recognize the
threat to our economy and reverse the trend."462
This was the "golden age" of private equity as those firms began raiding public
companies and taking them private.463 "Going-private transactions have risen dra-
matically in recent years, topping 25 percent of public takeovers in the last three
years." '464 Over 2100 private equity buyouts were consummated in the first ten
months of 2006 at $583 billion, up $291 billion from the prior twelve months.465
The total buyouts in 2006 reached $709.8 billion by year end."6 The value of com-
panies going private trebled between 2004 and 2006.467 The value of initial public
offerings in the United States in 2006 was less than one-half that of the public
companies that went private. 68 That trend continued into 2007,469 at least until a
credit crunch was experienced in mid-year.47 ° Those shrewd private equity investors
saw nothing amiss in allowing the managers of those companies to profit hand-
somely from the buyout and then award those same executives with equity stakes in
the acquired firm that will provide opportunity for even greater profits.
4 7
'
More capital was going into private equity funds than net flows into mutual
funds and more money was raised through private placements than through IPOs
in 2006.472 Private equity was accounting for more than 20 percent of acquisitions
461. Michael S. Malone, The Pump-and-Dump Economy, WALL ST. I., Dec. 21, 2006, at A16.
462. Gretchen Morgenson, Memo to Shareholders: Shut-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2007, § 3, at 1.
463. A Short-Lived Golden Age, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2007, at C12; see also Janet Adamy, Outback Steakhouse
Owner OSI Agrees to $3 Billion Buyout Deal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2006, at Al1; Christopher J. Chipello & Peter
Sanders, Four Seasons Chief Offers to Take Hotel Firm Private, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2006, at A3.
464. ZINGALES ET AL., supra note 165, at x.
465. Erin White & Gregory Zuckerman, The Private-Equity CEO, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2006, at Bl. Even
some giant public companies were being targeted for private acquisition. Eric Pfanner & Andrew Ross Sorkin,
Vivendi's Talks with Kohlberg Suggest Even the Biggest Are Fair Game, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2006 at Cl.
466. Ben White, Megabucks Deals for an Elite Few Pay Rewards, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 3, 2007, at 22.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. Francesco Guerrera, US Chiefs Executives Brace for a Year of Mounting Challenges, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 3, 2007, at 15.
470. Jason Singer & Dana Cimilluca, Corporate Buyers Hit Gas on Deals, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2007, at Cl.
However, at least one large bank thought that the private equity buyout binge might continue for some time.
Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Says the Buy-out Party Is Not Over, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 10, 2007 at 1.
471. Henny Sender & Dennis K. Berman, In Some Deals, Executives Get a Double Payday, WALL ST. J., Sept.
8, 2006, at C1.
472. ZINGALES ET AL., supra note 165, at x; Private Placement Deals Overtake IPOs, FIN. TIMES (London),
May 18, 2007, at 1.
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in the United States and Europe.4"3 Hedge funds and other private equity also sup-
plied $27.7 billion in financing to public companies in 2006 through private invest-
ments in public equity (PIPES).4 74 These deals proved to be too complex for the
SEC to comprehend so the SEC staff has virtually stopped the approval process for
such transactions. This bureaucratic paternalist distrust of the market to punish
those companies entering into improvident transactions is founded on the belief
that public company shareholders should be spared such discipline. To the con-
trary, each additional regulation or bureaucratic burden imposed on public com-
panies caused more funds to be shifted into private equity. Goldman Sachs even
developed a private market where institutional investors could trade in non-regis-
tered shares of private equity.
75
This shift from public to private equity has been ongoing for some time. Private
equity groups now control vast enterprises. They include the Blackstone Group
with $71 billion under management; the Carlyle Group with $47 billion; Bain Cap-
ital with $40 billion; KKR with $30 billion; Texas Pacific Group with $30 billion;
and Cerberus Capital Management with $24 billion.4 76 The Apollo Group, a private
equity fund operated by Leon Black, went on a $37 billion binge over a period of
three days purchasing, among others, Harrah's Entertainment and Realogy (Cold-
well Banker, Century 21, and Sotheby's International Realty). 477 The Blackstone
Group purchased Equity Office for $39 billion in February 2007.478 That number
was topped by KKR in the same month with a $45 billion offer for TXU Corp.479
These private equity groups were traditionally intensely private and sought to
prevent any public or regulatory scrutiny of their activities."4 That benefit made
them more nimble and exposed them to less regulatory costs, including the class
action lawsuits that every public company must now suffer. The effect of the exces-
sive regulation of public companies and the obsession with the compensation paid
to their executives was making public markets an undesirable place to raise capital.
The government, however, is institutionally incapable of leaving large capital amal-
473. Donald J. Gogel, What's So Great about Private Equity, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2006, at A13.
474. Judith Burns, SEC Slows Flow of PIPE Deals to a Trickle, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2006, at Ci.
475. Randall Smith, Goldman Takes "Private" Equity to a New Level, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2007, at Cl. This
was a means for private equity owners to cash out their profits privately, and other financial services firms
quickly acted to create a competitor. Wall Street Firms to Launch Electronic Trading Platform, WALL ST. J., July
24, 2007, at C6. Some private equity were also selling pieces of themselves to other large mega-investors like
China and Calpers, the California state employee pension fund. Henny Sender, Live at Apollo (Management):
Plan to Cash in, Limit Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2007, at Cl.
476. Charles Duhigg, Can Private Equity Build a Public Face?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006, § 3, at 1.
477. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Michael J. de la Merced, Deal Maker's 3-Day Tally: $37 Billion, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
20, 2006, at Cl.
478. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Terry Pristin, Takeover Battle Ends with Sale of Big Landlord, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2007, at Al.
479. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Clifford Krauss, At $45 Billion, New Contender for Top Buyout, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
24, 2007, at Al.
480. See generally DAN BRIODY, THE IRON TRIANGLE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE CARLYLE GROUP
(2003) (describing the operations of one private equity group).
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gamations alone and is searching for a way to regulate private equity. The antitrust
laws were rolled out to accomplish that goal.4"' The high profile acquisitions by
private equity groups also soon came under congressional scrutiny and threats of
increased taxes were raised." 2
In the face of these threats, private equity managers quickly decided that it was
time to cash in their chips, which they did by making their own public offerings. 3
Some of the largest private equity groups commenced such offerings in 2007, and
their profits were huge. 4 Partners in the Blackstone Group received $3.7 billion
from an IPO of their ownership interests.8 That was the amount of value that the
market believed those managers added to the companies they acquired. 6 Yet, to at
least some members of Congress, that was a bad thing and they are continuing
their efforts to impose additional taxes on such sales in order to take away that
added value and to discourage others from managing efficiently.
8 7
B. Market Inefficiency
The marketplace can decide what is excessive and what is not. To be sure, the
market efficiency advocates are taking a beating from the behavioral school that
posits that markets are affected by inefficiencies and even non-rational behavior. 8
One behavioralist has thus noted that:
481. Rob Cox, Private Equity's Bad Omen, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2007, at C16.
482. Alan S. Blinder, The Under-Taxed Kings of Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2007, at BU 4; Francesco
Guerrera et al., Blackstone Faces IPO Challenge in the Senate, FIN. TIMES (London), June 15, 2007, at 1; Fran-
cesco Guerrera & James Politi, US Private Equity Body Hits Out at "Hostility," FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 12,
2007, at 1.
483. Jenny Anderson, The Old Money in Private Equity Isn't Ready to Welcome the New, N.Y. TIM ES, July 20,
2007, at C45. Hedge funds, which have traditionally been private institutions, are also making initial public
offerings, claiming that this will provide more permanent capital that is free of the fluctuations caused by
redemptions available to hedge fund investors in traditional hedge fund models. Jenny Anderson, The Private
Lives of Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 29, 2006, at Cl; Michael J. de la Merced & Jenny Anderson, Hedge Funds
Continue Public Path, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2007, at Cl. That offering was a hot issue that traded up 68 percent
on its first day, making its managers multi-billionaires, at least on paper. Gregory Zuckerman et al., Hedge-
Fund Crowd Sees More Green as Fortress Hits Jackpot with IPO, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2007, at Al.
484. Even KKR, the firm that had so lauded the benefits of private equity, was planning to make an IPO of
its shares, but the proceeds from that offering were to be used for investment and not as a cash-out. Dennis K.
Berman & Henny Sender, KKR's IPO May Set Firm on Rugged Path, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2007, at Cl; Jay
Hancock, KKR's IPO Supposes Big Profits Are Endless, BALT. SUN, July 8, 2007, at IC. However, the private
equity IPOs were not proving to be popular in the market, and it appeared that the private equity wave was
cresting in July 2007. Private Equity's New World, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2007, at B14.
485. David Cay Johnston, Tax Loopholes Sweeten Deal for Blackstone, N.Y. TIMEs, July 13, 2007, at Al; James
Politi et al., Blackstone Founders to Collect $2.6 Billion, FIN. TIMES (London), June 12, 2007 at 1.
486. The Blackstone IPO traded down sharply after its early trading. A credit rating agency, Moody's, has
also questioned whether public companies fare better when they are privatized. News Briefing, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 9, 2007 at 1.
487. Stephen Labaton, Clinton Backs Higher Taxes for Investment Firm Managers, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2007,
at C2.
488. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipula-
tion, 74. N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 635 (1999). See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthi-
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Although a number of factors might affect CEO behavior, such as CEO age,
tenure, education, and socioeconomic background, I theorize that CEO over-
confidence is in important ways a product of corporate governance. Corporate
governance structure and practice in the United States is likely to lead to CEO
overconfidence in two key ways. The first relates to executive compensation. A
large executive compensation package gives positive feedback to a CEO and
signals that the chief executive is a success. Studies show that positive feedback
and recent success build confidence. In this view, the very process of winning
the tournament to become the top executive probably makes a CEO more con-
fident. Indeed, highly confident individuals presumably self-select into the
tournament to become CEO in the first place. The leading theoretical ap-
proaches to executive compensation-which generally break down into the so-
called 'optimal contracting approach' and the 'managerial power approach'-
try to explain the size and design of executive compensation, while other ap-
proaches focus on whether the size of CEO pay is 'just' or 'fair' as compared to
what the average worker receives. Stressing the possible link between CEO pay
and CEO overconfidence offers a new 'behavioral approach' to executive com-
pensation that is more concerned with the psychological consequences of execu-
tive pay--namely, the risk of bad business decisions, particularly
overinvestment, rooted in growing CEO confidence-than with the incentive
effects or fairness concerns associated with how and how much CEOs are
paid.4
8 9
The problem with this over-confidence theory is that critics of the behavioral
school contend that those theorists are too pessimistic in their analyses.49 °
One interesting development has been the use of the "independent investor test"
to determine whether salary payments in closely held corporations are unreasona-
bly large and should be deductible under the Internal Revenue Code.491 At least
some circuit courts are analyzing the salary payments to executives from the view-
point of a prospective investor to determine whether they are excessive based on
returns to investors. This is an approach that is consistent with the Chicago School
of Law and Economics efficient market theory and has been adopted by one of the
chief proponents of that school of thought, Judge Richard Posner.492 This analysis
ness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001) (discussing how internal
pressures affect corporate decision making).
489. Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corpo-
rate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 673, 678-79 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
490. Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behav-
ioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1907, 1910-13 (2002).
491. 26 U.S.C. § 162(c)(1) (2006).
492. See Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm'r, 196 F.3d 833, 834 (7th Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit also em-
ploys an independent investor test to provide "a lens through which the entire analysis should be viewed."
Dexsil Corp. v. Comm'r, 147 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 1998). See generally Barbara F. Sikon, The Recharacterization
of Unreasonable Compensation: An Equitable Mandate, 51 CLHV. ST. L. REv. 301 (2004) (describing this issue).
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raises the question of whether courts are in a position to decide what an indepen-
dent investor would want. Might such an investor forgo current returns on equity
for long term success? Nevertheless, this approach seeks to create a market test
where a market for the stock of the closely held corporation does not exist.493 For
that reason, it seems preferable to the old multi-prong test previously applied by
the Tax Court.
In all events, it is merely theoretical whether the market is as efficient as the
Chicago school claims or as inefficient as the behaviorists posit. In fact, the market
is actually like a democratic government. Everyone is allowed to express their views
in a democracy by voting at the ballot box. In a similar manner, market partici-
pants vote with their feet by selling or buying the stock ("the Wall Street rule"). In a
democracy, some bad presidents and members of congress are elected, bad laws are
passed and inefficiency abounds. This is because human beings are involved, and
human beings make mistakes and cupidity flourishes. The market is no different.
There will be periods of "irrational exuberance" 94 and depressions because of er-
rors on the part of market participants and the government. To paraphrase Win-
ston Churchill on democracy, it is simply the worst possible system except for any
other. 5 Certainly, the reformists and the SEC have proved that they cannot out-
perform the market when it comes to executive compensation.
One study found that increased executive compensation actually added value to
public companies on an overall basis. 96 A company that is overpaying its executives
will eventually fail or be crippled. A company that underpays will lose the execu-
tives that made it efficient, and it too will suffer. So, what happens to the investor
in the interim? Actually nothing, if the investor is sufficiently diversified. Diversifi-
cation will bring both underpaying and overpaying companies into the portfolio as
well as those who have it just right. Even with all the flaws in executive compensa-
tion, the stock market has historically outperformed other investments in the long
run.497
A more difficult problem is dealing with the public outrage over large executive
compensation packages. The prosecution of celebrity financiers serves as a sop to
493. By definition, a close corporation is one with only a few shareholders and no public market for its
stock. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511- 14 (Mass. 1975); Meisel-
man v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 557-59 (N.C. 1983).
494. For the benefit of future generations, this was a famous remark by Alan Greenspan, chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board, made in reference to the euphoria that was driving up the stock market in 1996. In
retrospect, Mr. Greenspan was a bit premature because the market did not break until 2000. MARKHAM,
CORPORATE SCANDALS, supra note 11, at 34-35.
495. Id. at 650- 51. Churchill also stated that "[slome regard private enterprise as if it were a predatory tiger
shot. Others look upon it as a cow that they can milk. Only a handful see it for what it really is-the strong
horse that pulls the whole cart." BrainyQuote.com, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/w/winston-
churchill.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
496. Jerry Taylor & Jagadeesh Gokhale, Pay Bosses More!, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2007, at Al1.
497. Some economists are challenging that claim. David Wessel, Sometimes, Stocks Go Nowhere for Years,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1997, at Al.
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the envy, jealousy and even outrage that arises over each disclosure of the giant
compensation packages given to executives. Nevertheless, there are probably better
ways to deal with those emotions. One is to view it as if the CEO won the lottery.
Those executives took huge risks and, and beyond the lottery winner, worked hard
and battled with sometimes Byzantine corporate politics to reach the pinnacle
where they last on average only four years. ' If we do not resent lottery winners,
why not treat the executive the same way?499
Entertainers also accumulate vast wealth with little resentment, but the SEC ex-
empts their pay packages from public exposure."' 0 Some of the payouts to enter-
tainers are truly astonishing. Shock jock Howard Stern was paid $500 million to
bring his low brow, smutty talk show to Sirius Satellite Radio. Stern was given
another $82 million in 2006 as a bonus. 1 George Lucas was paid an estimated
$290 million in one year period, Oprah Winfrey got $225 million (she is worth in
total over $1 billion), Mel Gibson-$185 million, David Copperfield, the magician,
received $57 million, and Madonna garnered $50 million for whatever she does.50 2
What about those athletes? Many professional athletes draw down huge pay
packages, but there is no longer much resentment or envy of those individuals. The
average salary in the National Football League is $1.3 million, in major league base-
ball the average is $2.7 million, and the average salary is $4.2 million in the Na-
tional Basketball Association. 5 3 David Beckham, the European soccer star was paid
$250 million to join a Los Angeles team as 2007 began.50 4 One year earnings for
other athletes included: Tiger Woods-$87 million, Lance Armstrong-$28 mil-
lion, Andrea Agassi-$26.2 million, Serena Williams-$12.7 million, and Michael
Schumacher, the race car driver, got a cool $60 million.0 5 Baseball players have also
received some impressive contracts. Pitcher Barry Zito was given a seven-year con-
tract valued at $126 million.0 6 Another pitcher, Kevin Brown, was paid $105 mil-
lion under a seven-year contract, but did not do much pitching.0 7 Michelle Wie,
the sixteen year old golfer, was being paid over $10 million a year for endorse-
498. Editorial, The Un-Imperial CEO, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2006, at A8.
499. In fact, most CEOs are self made, having neither the advantage of family wealth nor even an ivy league
education. Carol Hymowitz, 'Any College Will Do,' WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2006, at BI.
500. See supra note 365 and accompanying text (describing the "Katie Couric amendment" to the SEC
executive compensation disclosure rules).
501. $82.9 Million for Howard Stern, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2007, at C2.
502. Forbes.com, The Celebrity 100, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2005/53/Rankl.html (last visited July 12,
2007).
503. Daniel Gross, The N.F.L.'s Blue-Collar Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007, § 4, at 5.
504. That contract was for five years. Agence France-Presse, Beckham Done at Real Madrid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 2007, § 8, at 10.
505. Forbes.com, The Celebrity 100, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2005/53/Athletes-Rankl.html (last vis-
ited July 12, 2007).
506. Murray Chass, In the Long Run, Great Arms Mean Big Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2007, at D2.
507. Id.
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ments" 8 It would take 200 years for a worker earning $50,000 per year to match
that child athlete's earnings from a single year. If the time value of money is consid-
ered, that time period would be lengthened even more. But Wei's endorsement
money was pocket change for LeBron James, who signed endorsement deals worth
over $100 million after he was drafted out of high school into the NBA at age
eighteen. 0 9
There is little outrage or resentment over payouts to athletes and entertainers, so
why the hue and cry over Richard Grasso's package for which he worked a lifetime?
To be sure there is an occasional celebrity prosecution involving athletes and enter-
tainers, but those prosecutions are usually based on sexual or other peccadilloes.
For example, before being jailed for rape, Mike Tyson blew through some $300
million in earnings from his career as a heavyweight boxer."' 0 Michael Jackson
squandered $300 million in royalties on excesses that included his Neverland Valley
Ranch and amusement park where he entertained small boys."' The excessive exec-
utive compensation crowd expressed no resentment over those earnings.
Of course for every successful professional athlete and pop star, there are mil-
lions of amateurs who did not win the lottery in the gene pool. If the American
public can accept the wealth of a few successful (and sometimes unsuccessful) ath-
letes and entertainers with little resentment, then why the hysteria over the large
salaries paid to corporate executives? After all, those executives control the re-
sources that employ millions of individuals and shape our economic destiny.
Should they not be richly rewarded for those efforts? Sports and entertainment are
good things, and they produce many jobs, but do they compare to the value added
to society by large corporations that provide the necessities of life and protect our
health and welfare? So, why not take the same hands-off approach for corporate
executives that we do for lottery winners, entertainers and athletes?
Surely, it is also time to stop the hysteria over executive perks, such as the use of
the corporate jet.512 Reality needs to be faced. Corporate jets cannot be justified on
economic grounds, including saving executive time. Commercial service, usually
first class, is available nearly everywhere. Executives can be chauffeured to those
flights, and executive influence could be used with the federal government to ob-
tain a corporate EZ Pass to speed through security. In those rare instances where
time is actually of the essence, corporate charters are readily available. Even the
CEO who does not want to sit with the unwashed masses in the first class cabin,
508. Damon Hack, With Fanfare and Dollar Signs, Wie Becomes a Professional, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at
D5.
509. Thomas Heath, James Already Is All-Star Pitchman; $100 Million so Far in Endorsements, WASH. POST,
Aug. 19, 2003, at D01.
510. George Kimball, Boxing; A Heavyweight with Heavy Baggage, Bos. HERALD, Jan. 3, 2005, at 102.
511. Jeff Leeds et al., Thriller: Rescuing a Sinking Pop Star, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2006, § 3, at 1.
512. For a defense of corporate jets and other perks as a means of increasing shareholder wealth, see M.
Todd Henderson & James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense of Perks, Executive Loans, and Conspicuous
Consumption, 93 GEo. L.J. 1835 (2005).
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could just book the whole cabin, which would be considerably cheaper than a flight
on a Gulfstream GV.
In truth, the corporate jet is simply a toy that most of the executives using them
earned, so let them have it. Much business is accomplished and relationships estab-
lished on the golf course and at sporting events where those jets have a tendency to
travel. As the Tenth Circuit noted in the Wittig case,"1 3 the incremental cost of
personal jaunts on corporate aircraft is not great, so why all the fuss? Once the
decision is made to purchase a corporate jet, most of the costs are already assumed
by the corporation with or without personal use. Where there is a serious abuse,
such as Ross Johnson's fleet, let the market deal with it. Remember, Johnson lost
the battle for control of RJR Nabisco. To be sure, Johnson was well compensated in
defeat, but he was in the end defeated and vanquished from the field. Moreover,
perks are not a large part of most compensation packages. Tyco might be an excep-
tion, but even the celebrated apartment bought by the company for Kozlowski's use
was sold for a profit." 4
The government and reformers should remove themselves from the business of
trying to regulate executive compensation. This means that the SEC's executive
compensation rules should be chucked. That would lessen the demand for ever
higher pay packages. Even required disclosures concerning the income and assets of
government officials is expressed only in terms of broad ranges under the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978, that are almost meaningless."' 5 If disclosure is required at
all for executive pay, it should be in the form of total executive compensation and
not focus on individuals. This will allow shareholder monitoring, to the extent
513. United States v. Lake, 472 F.3d 1247, 1259 (10th Cir. 2007).
514. William Neuman, Tyco to Sell Ex-Chiefs Apartment for $21 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2004, at C1. If
corporate jets and other perks are to be regulated, then why not also regulate the "trophy wives" that are
another accoutrement of high-flying executives? See Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 905 (N.J. 1979)
(respondent, apparently no immediate relation to Dennis Kozlowski at Tyco, abandoned both a wife and a
paramour of many years in favor of a trophy wife "30 years younger"). These new wives must have every bauble
in the jewelry store, every designer dress on the rack and must throw expensive celebrity galas and decorate a
number of mansions. Those expenses are all paid for through the executive's compensation. In addition, corpo-
rate coffers must be raided to pay the tens of millions of dollars due the trophy wife when she inevitably ages
and is traded in like a used car for a younger more attractive version.
What about all those tax deductible charitable donations that executives use for social climbing and build-
ing monuments to themselves? Those payments too are made directly or indirectly from the corporate treasury.
A good example is the now infamous $1 million "donation" by Citigroup chairman Sandy Weill to the 92nd St.
Y. in order to have the children of Jack Grubman, one of the company's financial analysts, admitted to that
exclusive preschool program. The donation was allegedly part of a Byzantine scheme to obtain the support of
an AT&T executive serving on the Citigroup board for Weill's takeover from his co-CEO, John Reed, and to
obtain AT&T's investment banking business. That and other scandals at Citigroup led to the appointment of
Charles Prince as Weill's successor. Prince was the former general counsel for Citigroup. Prince was joined by
two other lawyers as vice chairmen. In re Salomon Analyst AT&T Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 455, 458-63 (S.D.N.Y.
2004). Grubman later claimed that the $1 million donation was not a quid pro quo for his report, as did Sandy
Weill who was at other times a true philanthropist, contributing and raising large sums for the Carnegie Hall
and the Cornell Medical School. WEILL & KRAUSHAAR, supra note 69, at 423-26, 434-39.
515. See Robert G. Vaughn, Ethics in Government and the Vision of Public Service, 58 GEO. WAsH. L. REV.
417, 438 (1990) (describing these disclosure requirements).
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there is such a thing. After these restrictions are removed, compensation commit-
tees will be free to consider a broad ranger of incentives.
Returning compensation to the marketplace would also mean removing the limi-
tation on the deductibility of salaries. That would encourage increased salaries,
allowing the executive to focus on longer-term strategies and lessening dependence
on options that are valued by short-term quarterly earnings. The executives will be
taxed on those salaries and there is no reason why they should not be deductible.
Congress should finally concede that encouraging options over salaries through
their deductibility was a monumental mistake. Incredibly, however, the focus in
Congress now is to limit deductibility of both options and salaries rather than
remove the restriction on salaries."1 6 Apparently, some congressional members
seem to think this would act like a cap for all compensation.
Congressman Barney Frank, the new chairman of the House Financial Services
Committee, has introduced a "Protection Against Executive Compensation Abuse
Act" that would preclude deductions for executive compensation in excess of more
than twenty-five times the lowest amount paid to any employee. The present aver-
age amount is more than 400 times the average worker."s 7 Such a limitation if effec-
tive in its goals would certainly drive anyone with any entrepreneurial skills away
from the management of a public company. Once again, however, limiting deduct-
ibility will only result in a tax increase on the shareholders because once compensa-
tion becomes measured in this fashion, executives will be vying with each other for
the highest multiple. As one columnist notes: "The result, I suspect, would be disas-
trous. Average multiples would promptly be calculated .... Any self-respecting
CEO would then demand to be in the top quartile and damn the consequences."5 t8
Other proposed legislation seeks to limit the amount of deferred compensation that
can be tax advantaged, but that too would be passed onto shareholders through
gross-ups1 90r drive them back to options as compensation. It may also affect mid-
dle managers adversely. 2 °
516. Charles Forelle & Kara Scannell, Revisiting Executive-Pay Law, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 6, 2006, at C1. Gov-
ernment regulators were more circumspect, urging Congress to defer such action. Eric Dash, Congress Is Urged
to Hold Off Acting on Options and Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at C3.
517. Foroohar with Sheridan, supra note 377. One politically correct company, Whole Foods Market, Inc.,
has tried to limit executive pay packages to a multiple of average worker's earnings, but found that it had to
raise the multiple from eight to nineteen times average worker pay to remain competitive. That multiple also
does not apply to stock option grants to executives. Phred Dvorak, Limits on Executive Pay Easy to Set, Hard to
Keep, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2007, at B 1. The chairman of that company, John P. Mackey, paid himself $1 a year.
However, he was found to have been secretly posting blogs on the Internet under a pseudonym that were
pumping his company's stock and disparaging a rival company he was trying to acquire. Andrew Martin, Whole
Foods Executive Used Alias, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2007, at Cl.
518. Tony Jackson, Investors Should Be Wary of Backlash Over Top People's Pay, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 3,
2007, at 34.
519. Sarah Lueck, Politics & Economics: Strike One for Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2007, at A4;
Gretchen Morgenson, Is the Fix Worse Than the Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2007, § 3, at 1.
520. Editorial, Executive Camp, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2007, at A12.
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On the plus side, executives may increase salary compensation because there
would no longer be a tax incentive to pay options instead of salaries, leading to
more balanced pay packets. For example, executive compensation could include a
salary significant enough to secure the allegiance of the executive and allow that
executive to focus on the long-term goals of the company. That executive could also
be given restricted stock to secure those same goals and provide even greater incen-
tive to manage in the long term. Another part of a more balanced pay package
could include options in an amount that would also assure the executive that a
good quarter will be rewarded without pulling that executive from long-term stra-
tegic plans. Of course, the particular mixture of compensation will be in the hands
of the compensation committee. That committee will be in a much better position
to negotiate the appropriate compensation package if unencumbered by artificial
restrictions and unneeded disclosures.52" '
VI. CONCLUSION
Corporate reformers have attacked executive compensation through fiduciary duty
claims over the years, but that effort failed, as evidenced most recently by the
Michael Ovitz case at Walt Disney. The "progressive" income tax code was another
unsuccessful reform effort. Tax levels were almost confiscatory for several decades,
but those taxes were largely avoided or evaded through a number of means. Tax
levels have now been lowered to more reasonable levels that have raised tax collec-
tions. Corporate reformers have also held a dream that limiting excessive executive
compensation can be dealt with by aligning shareholder and management interests
through stock options. Congress assisted in that misguided effort by punitively tax-
ing salaries over $1 million. That approach failed, as witnessed by the orgy of com-
pensation paid out to executives during the market run up in the 1990s.
521. The new CEO at GE has joined the reform movement. Jeffrey Immelt proclaimed that CEOs should
not allow their compensation to outstrip that of senior managers. Immelt also urged curbing the role of paid
consultants who design ever more imaginative ways to increase executive compensation. Chrystia Freeland &
Francesco Guerrera, GE Head Wades into Pay Debate, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 3, 2006, at 17. The faltering
Ford Motor Company is using a more balanced compensation arrangement for its new CEO, Alan Mulally,
who was recruited from Boeing. Since Ford has operated as a bloated bureaucracy for years, it is difficult to
trust their judgment in matters of compensation. It was also under fire after disclosure that one of its execu-
tives, Mark Fields, was allowed to commute between his home, Florida, and Detroit on the company jet at a
cost of over $200,000 per quarter. The operations that Fields' managed lost $3.3 billion in the first nine months
of 2006. Jeffrey McCracken, Ford's Domestic Chief Raises Eyebrows over Jet Perk, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2007, at A4.
Fields gave up the jet after much criticism in the press. Jeffrey McCracken, Ford's Domestic Chief Ends Personal
Use of let, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2007, at Al0. In any event, Mulally will receive a $2 million salary, a $18.5
million signing bonus, and compensation for the loss of options at his old employer, 600,000 shares of re-
stricted stock, and 4 million options; not a shabby payout. John D. Stoll, Ford's New CEO to Get $2 Million in
Base Salary, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2006, at A3. Hiring Fields did not prevent the record $12.7 billion loss by Ford
in 2006. Jeffrey McCracken, Big Three Face New Obstacles in Restructuring, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2007, at Al.
Interestingly, Boeing was also out recruiting, luring W. James McNerney Jr., away from 3M with a "golden
hello" package valued at $52 million. Julie Creswell, Pay Packages Allow Executives to Jump Ship with Less Risk,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2006, at Al.
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The SEC joined with the reformers, but sought to use full disclosure as a way to
shame executives into not seeking excessive compensation. Both the SEC and the
reformers failed in curbing excessive compensation. Indeed, if anything, those ef-
forts only spurred the ever increasingly large compensation packages. Undaunted,
the SEC has once again demanded more disclosures as a way to curb excesses. That
effort no doubt will also fail.
It is time for the SEC and reformers to remove themselves from the compensa-
tion picture. The market must decide these issues. The market is, of course, imper-
fect and there will continue to be excesses. Nonetheless, market discipline will at
least provide a check on the worst of the abuses, unlike the efforts of the SEC and
the reformers who have only encouraged ever increasing compensation packages.
This change in course is overdue. The public corporation is losing its appeal as an
investment medium in America. The strangling regulations imposed by the SEC
and Sarbanes-Oxley are imposing unjustified costs with no success in curbing pay
or corruption. Prosecutions, class action lawsuits, and corporate governance gad-
flies are pushing companies and executives into private equity companies that are
unregulated and free from much of the scrutiny of prosecutors and class action
lawyers.
It is unclear what the effect of privatizing large businesses will be on the econ-
omy. If history is a guide, the effects will probably be good, but the private equity
managers are now cashing out their investments through IPOs because they too are
finding themselves under threat of regulation. That is unfortunate. After all,
America became the wealthiest nation in the world in the nineteenth century with-
out the benefit of the federal securities laws. It seems a shame to deprive investors
of a public market in which they can invest in companies. Like the war that was
waged in Vietnam, it appears as though the government believes that, in order to
protect those investors, the market must be so heavily regulated that it cannot exist.
Is it not time to back off and let public companies enjoy the same competitive
advantages as private ones, which appear to be efficient and relatively scandal-free
despite their lack of regulation?
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